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1 28 21 
IN DEFENSE OF MORAL CREDIBILITY 
 




 The criminal justice system’s reputation with the community can have a 
significant effect on the extent to which people are willing to comply with its 
demands and internalize its norms. In the context of criminal law, the empirical 
studies suggest that ordinary people expect the criminal justice system to do 
justice and avoid injustice, as they perceive it – what has been called “empirical 
desert” to distinguish it from the “deontological desert” of moral philosophers. 
The empirical studies and many real-world natural experiments suggest that a 
criminal justice system that regularly deviates from empirical desert loses moral 
credibility and thereby loses crime-control effectiveness. These crime-control 
benefits, together with an analysis of the sometimes-disqualifying weaknesses of 
alternative distributive principles such as general deterrence and incapacitation 
of the dangerous, suggest that maximizing the criminal law’s moral credibility is 
the best distributive principle available. Critics have offered a range of objections 
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 When the community observes the criminal law as regularly doing injustice or failing to 
do justice, the law’s reputation as a reliable moral authority suffers. This loss in moral credibility 
tends to reduce people’s willingness to defer to and acquiesce in the criminal law’s demands 
and undermines the criminal law’s ability to have people internalize its norms. And where the 
disillusionment arises from the criminal law’s failure to do justice, it can provoke vigilantism. 
One of us has argued for several decades that these observations, which are backed by 
common sense, repeated anecdotal evidence, and empirical studies, suggest that criminal law’s 
distributive principle for criminal liability and punishment ought to be to maximize the law’s 
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moral credibility with the community, which can generally be done most effectively by having 
criminal law rely upon rules and policies that track the community’s justice judgments, so-called 
empirical desert.1 
 Recent events have illustrated some of these effects of reduced moral credibility. Those 
who believe that police regularly engage in wrongdoing without consequences have expressed 
their outrage in sometimes violent protest, attacking police and police stations. Those who see 
these violent protestors as regularly escaping punishment, often with the acquiescence of 
government officials, have confronted the protesters, sometimes violently. This downward 
spiral of disillusionment and vigilantism is just one of the mechanisms by which the system’s 
poor reputation for doing justice reduces its crime-control effectiveness. 
 Some writers have criticized the proposal for a criminal law distributive principle that 
maximizes moral credibility.2 This Article organizes and responds to those criticisms. The 
proposal and the criticisms of it are of four parts. First, some criticisms challenge the claimed 
causal connection between a system’s reduced moral credibility and people’s inclination to 
comply and defer, issues taken up in Part II. Another kind of criticism challenges the claim that 
criminal law rules that conflict with community views undermine the system’s moral credibility, 
examined in Part III. A third kind of criticism suggests that it is simply impossible to construct a 
distributive principle that will minimize conflicts with community views, discussed in Part IV. 
Part V examines other philosophical, political, and ideological objections that have been 
offered. Part VI raises what may be the most important point in the debate: even if one could 
find flaws in the proposed distributive principle of maximizing moral credibility by minimizing 
criminal law’s conflicts with community views – we agree the proposed distributive principle 
has weaknesses, although not those claimed by its critics – such a distributive principle is still 
the best available because all alternatives have greater, sometimes disqualifying, flaws. In other 
words, the greatest strength of moral credibility as a distributive principle may be the 
weaknesses of all alternatives. Some potential weaknesses of the proposed distributive 
principle that critics have not raised are offered in Part VII. 
 
 
1 PAUL ROBINSON, INTUITIONS OF JUSTICE AND THE UTILITY OF DESERT (Oxford 2013); PAUL ROBINSON, DISTRIBUTIVE PRINCIPLES OF 
CRIMINAL LAW: WHO SHOULD BE PUNISHED HOW MUCH? (Oxford 2008); Paul Robinson & Josh Bowers, Perceptions of 
Fairness & Justice: The Shared Aims and Occasional Conflicts of Legitimacy and Moral Credibility, 47 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV., 211 (2012); Paul Robinson, Geoff Goodwin & Michael Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1940 
(2010); Paul Robinson, Empirical Desert, in Robinson, Garvey & Ferzan, eds., CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, 29-39, 61-
66 (2009); Paul Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 
CAMBRIDGE L. J. 145-175 (2008); Paul Robinson & John Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and 
Justice Policy, 81 SOUTHERN CAL. L. REV., 1-67 (2007); Paul Robinson & John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 
NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 453 (1998); Paul Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is 
Just? Coercive vs. Normative Crime Control 86 U.VA.  L. REV. 1839-1869 (2000). 
2 John Rappaport, Some Doubts About “Democratizing Criminal Justice” 87 U. CHI. L. REV., 711 (2020); Christopher 
Slobogin, Empirical Desert and Preventive Justice: A Comment, 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 376 (2014). Julian Roberts & Jan 
de Keijser, Democratizing Punishment: Sentencing, Community Views, and Values, 16 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 474 
(2014); Alice Ristroph, Third Wave Legal Moralism, 42 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1151 (2010); Mary Sigler, The Methodology of 
Desert, 42 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 1173 (2010); Mary Sigler, The False Promise of Empirical Desert, in Robinson, Garvey & 
Ferzan, eds., CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, 39-41 (2009); Adam Kolber, Compliance-Promoting Intuitions, in 
Robinson, Garvey & Ferzan, eds., CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, 41-43 (2009); Alice Ristroph, The New Desert, in 
Robinson, Garvey & Ferzan, eds., CRIMINAL LAW CONVERSATIONS, 45-49 (2009); Adam Kolber, How to Improve 
Empirical Desert 75 BROOK. L. REV. 433 (2009); Deborah Denno, The Perils of Public Opinion, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 741 
(2000); Kenneth Simons, The Relevance of Community Values to Just Desert: Criminal Law, Punishment Rationales, 
and Democracy, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635 (2000). 
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II. Moral Credibility and Crime 
 
 The first of our claims is that the criminal law’s loss of moral credibility with the 
community that it governs undermines its ability to gain deference, acquiescence, compliance, 
assistance, and internalization of its norms. Instead, such disillusionment is likely to provoke 
resistance, subversion, and vigilante action. 
 
A. The Criminogenic Effects of Reduced Credibility 
 
 In many ways, the suggestion that criminal law’s reduced moral credibility causes 
reduced compliance is just common sense. If a criminal law is widely viewed as unjust or 
unwilling to do justice, would we assume that this perception has no effect on the community’s 
deference to that law? In what world would such a poor performance in doing justice – the 
criminal justice system’s announced purpose – be a matter of complete indifference to citizens? 
And when such disillusionment does set in, do we think people would simply remain as 
compliant? 
 
 1. The Disillusionment-Noncompliance Dynamic in Natural Experiments 
 
 But is this commonsense view confirmed by experimental analysis? Not many 
governments in the world are likely to give the social psychologist experimenter permission to 
degrade the justness of their criminal justice system to see the resulting rising crime. But there 
have been a variety of natural experiments in which the criminal justice system’s moral 
credibility has been noticeably degraded, and a corresponding reduction in compliance ensued. 
Consider a few examples of these natural experiments.  
 In 1920, Congress prohibited the sale, manufacture, and transportation of alcohol within 
the U.S. with the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment. Demand for alcohol remained high, 
however, and illegal stills, bootlegging operations, and speakeasies flourished. When even 
government officials openly ignored the rules of Prohibition, this overt disrespect for the 
criminal law reinforced public disillusionment with the Prohibition movement. As trust in the 
law waned, Americans violated the law to an even greater extent. The disillusionment tainted 
not only the alcohol prohibition rules but also reduced compliance with criminal law rules 
unrelated to alcohol.3 
 An analogous dynamic is seen in widespread resistance to the draft during the Vietnam 
War, which was enforced by criminal statutes requiring service. Starting in 1964, many young 
men fled the country or feigned injuries or illnesses in order to avoid service. Many who did not 
resist were nonetheless highly critical in their view of not only this particular crime – failure to 
report – but the criminal justice system and the government generally.4 This view was 
supported by a significant portion of the public. Polls showed a society-wide dramatic drop in 
 
3 PAUL ROBINSON & SARAH ROBINSON, PIRATES, PRISONERS, AND LEPERS: LESSONS FROM LIFE OUTSIDE THE LAW 139-163 (2015). 
4 Ilyana Kuziemko, Did the Vietnam Draft Increase Human Capital Dispersion? Draft-Avoidance Behavior By Race 




trust in government.5 6 With this widespread disillusionment, crime rose significantly; crime 
statistics showed an enormous spike for both crimes of violence and property crimes.7 The 
Vietnam War was seen by many as exposing a moral stain on American institutions that had 
long been widely trusted and revered. In response to this disillusionment, many people felt free 
to abandon self-regulating behaviors and to commit crimes.8  
 This same dynamic between the criminal law’s credibility and compliance is seen anyone 
in variety of situations across many different eras and cultures. To give an example with 
present-day relevance, in 1918, as the Spanish Flu swept through the United States, 
communities across the country instituted a number of public health measures to slow the 
spread. Foremost among these was mask wearing.9 However, many people were unpersuaded 
that the inconvenience and the intrusiveness of the government action was justified by its 
supposed health benefits. When some local governments imposed mandatory mask ordinances 
and punished those who flouted the law with jail terms and fines,10 many in the community 
resisted. The sense that the mask mandates were excessive and the punishments unfair 
sparked protests en masse. In Denver, one local newspaper reported that the order to wear a 
mask was “almost totally ignored by the people; in fact, the order was a cause of mirth.”11 In 
San Francisco, 2,000 members of the Anti-Mask League held a rally to denounce the mask 
ordinance.12 and in Tucson, despite widespread arrests and incarceration, the mask ordinance 
 
5 Josh Zeitz, How Americans Lost Faith in Government, WASH. POST. (Jan. 30, 2018) 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/made-by-history/wp/2018/01/30/how-americans-lost-faith-in-
government/.  
6 Writing in the New York Review of Books at the time, Hannah Arendt explained, “Truth or falsehood – it does not 
matter any more, if your life depends on your acting as though you trusted; truth that can be relied on disappears 
from public life and with it the chief stabilizing factor in the ever-changing affairs of men.” Hannah Arendt, Lying in 
Politics: Reflections on the Pentagon Papers N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 18, 1971) 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1971/11/18/lying-in-politics-reflections-on-the-pentagon-pape/.  
7 Crime Rate Up 11% for Nation in 1970 N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 10, 1971) 
https://www.nytimes.com/1971/09/10/archives/crime-rate-up-11-for-nation-in-1970-crime-in-nation-up-11-in-
1970.html.  
8 Steven Pinker, Decivilization in the 1960s 2 HUMAN FIGURATIONS 2 (July 2013) 
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/h/humfig/11217607.0002.206/--decivilization-in-the-1960s?rgn=main;view=fulltext.  
9 James Rolph, Proclamation of Mayor Asks Masks For All, S.F. CHRONICLE at 8 (Oct. 22, 1918) 
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/f/flu/1620flu.0009.261/1/--proclamation-of-mayor-asks-masks-for-
all?rgn=full+text;view=image;q1=conscience%2C+patriotism+and+self-
protection+demand+immediate+and+rigid+compliance. San Francisco Mayor James Rolph told citizens, 
“Conscience, patriotism and self-protection demand immediate and rigid compliance;”) John Davie, Wear Mask, 
Says Law, Or Face Arrest, OAKLAND TRIB. at 9 (Oct. 25, 1918) https://quod.lib.umich.edu/f/flu/8540flu.0007.458/1/--
wear-mask-says-law-or-face-arrest?rgn=full+text;view=image;q1=Face+Arrest (Oakland Mayor John Davie 
explained to his constituents: “It is sensible and patriotic, no matter what our personal beliefs may be, to 
safeguard our fellow citizens by joining in this practice.” 
10 J. Alexander Navarro, Mask Resistance During a Pandemic Isn’t New – In 1918 Many Americans Were “Slackers” 
MICHIGAN HEALTH (Oct. 29, 2020) https://healthblog.uofmhealth.org/wellness-prevention/mask-resistance-during-a-
pandemic-isnt-new-1918-many-americans-were-slackers. 
11 New Orders Are Issued By Officials in Flu Fight ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS 1, 5 (Nov. 26, 1918) 
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/f/flu/2290flu.0003.922/3/--new-orders-are-
issued?page=root;rgn=full+text;size=200;view=image;q1=New+Orders+are+issued.  





was intentionally disregarded.13 In Tucson, the local paper declared that the mask ordinance 
“was incapable of enforcement. No matter how many citizens the city authorities might have 
taken to the lock-up nor how many fines they imposed, they never could have brought about 
the general observance of masking.”14 In fact, irritated as they were by the mask ordinances 
and their associated criminal penalties, people took more and more liberties, hosting large 
gatherings, and refusing to wear a mask properly (or refusing to wear a mask at all) even when 
under the scrutiny of officers.15 Crimes in other areas of life rose as well; prostitution expanded 
as did drug consumption, and attacks on immigrants.16 Without buy-in from the community 
generally, greater enforcement served only to provoke greater resistance and reduced 
compliance. 
 In the 1960s Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles, where violations of the criminal law 
were increasingly met with charges and sentences that seemed to residents grossly 
disproportionate, the aggressive policing and punishment did not reduce crime, as intended, 
but rather increased it,17 as the criminal law’s credibility within the neighborhood increasingly 
weakened. (In August 1965, this tension came to a boiling point after a Watts resident’s violent 
encounter with the police inspired the community to take to the streets. An official 
investigation of the Watts riots conducted by the California Governor found that the riot was a 
result of the Watts community’s long-growing grievances and discontent with criminal law 
enforcement.18) 
 In Gilded Age New York City. At the end of the 19th century, the legislative process in 
New York City was notoriously corrupt: even valuable and legitimate legislation could not be 
passed unless the right political players were paid off.19 The result was a criminal law that 
simply failed to address the full range of conduct that social mores at the time saw as 
condemnable, such as abortion, gambling, and pornography.20 As the criminal law came to be 
 
13 Bradford Luckingham, To Mask or Not to Mask: A Note on the 1918 Spanish Influenza Epidemic in Tucson 25 J. OF 
ARIZ.HIST. 191, 200 (1984). 
14 Id. at 201-202 
15 Id. at 202 
16 DAVID BLANKE, THE 1910S (2002). 
17 See James Queally, Watts Riot: Traffic Stop Was the Spark that Iggnited Days of Destruction in L.A. L.A. TIMES (July 
29, 2015) https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-watts-riots-explainer-20150715-htmlstory.html 
(explaining that “Anger and distrust between Watts’ residents, the police, and city officials had been simmering for 
years” and that many Watts residents suggested that the “riot had been triggered by long-smoldering resentment 
against alleged police brutality”); see also Elizabeth Hinton, From the War on Poverty to the War on Crime 108 
(arguing that “haphazard, undisciplined, and aggressive police response only spawned an ever-more-violent 
reaction” and police warned that aggressive policing had backfired by “starting guerilla war in the streets”). 
18 Watts Riot, CIV. RIGHTS DIGITAL LIB. (last modified Jan. 7, 2021) http://crdl.usg.edu/events/watts_riots/?Welcome.  
19 Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities 34 (1904) Lincoln Steffens’ essays on corruption in McClure’s Magazine 
painted a dismal picture of a political system hanging to credibility by a thread. Discussing the rampant rent-
seeking practices to get legislation passed, Steffens wrote, “As there was a scale for favorable legislation, so there 
was one for defeating bills. It made a difference whether the privilege asked was legitimate or not. But nothing 
was passed free of charge.” 
20 Charles Ellwood, Has Crime Increased in the United States Since 1880? 1 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 378, 
378 (1910);  
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seen as increasingly out of touch with community norms, crime increased.21 Street gangs 
proliferated and even shoplifting among middle-class women rose.22 
 In divided Berlin at the beginning of the Cold War, Berlin was divided into occupation 
zones controlled by the U.S., Great Britain, and France – the Allied Sectors – and the Soviet 
Union – East Berlin. In 1948, after negotiations between the allies and the Soviets broke down, 
the Soviets restricted the delivery of food, coal, and other crucial supplies into the Allied 
Sectors and controlled distribution within East Berlin according to political ideology.23 Only 
those who professed allegiance to the Kremlin received provisions.24 The restrictions created a 
thriving black market, which the Soviets worked to prevent with increasingly harsh penalties for 
unauthorized dealings.25 These penalties were enforced by police officers who were chosen 
because of their “political reliability” – their commitment to the Kremlin – rather than 
professional competence.26  In that sense, the laws could never be seen as fair, neutral, or 
unpolitical.27 But as the penalties for such offenses went up, the stigma surrounding such 
lawbreaking went down and lawbreaking actually increased.28 These small acts of resistance 
aimed not only to secure sustenance for Berliners but also to signal that Soviet justice system 
was no longer seen as morally credible.29 After all, black market dealing was to some extent an 
ideological threat to the Soviet political project, exemplifying free market enterprise in no 
uncertain terms.30 Despite the greater scarcity in the Allied Sectors, East Berliners increasingly 
escaped to West Berlin, in part because they felt they could better trust the government and 
 
21 Daniel Czitron, New York Exposed: The Gilded Age Police Scandal That Launched the Progressive Era 88, 246-247 
(2016); Elizabeth Garner Mazerick, Selling Sex: 19th Century New York City Prostitution and Brothels THE DIG (Sept. 
3, 2017) https://digpodcast.org/2017/09/03/19th-century-new-york-city-brothels/; NEW YORK: ART AND CULTURAL 
CAPITAL OF THE GILDED AGE 211 (Laster & Bruner eds., 2018) (explaining that despite the strenuous efforts of social 
reformers, “pornography constituted an insistent part of Gilded Age visual culture”). 
22 Dan Herbeck, Crime was Rampant and Routine in 19th Century New York City, THE BUFFALO NEWS (Feb. 10, 1991) 
https://buffalonews.com/news/crime-was-rampant-and-routine-in-19th-century-new-york-city/article_bee1c130-
9005-5c8e-9443-a3188c1bb889.html; HERBERT ASBURY, THE GANGS OF NEW YORK 64, 232 (Vintage, 2008); ELAINE 
ABELSON, WHEN LADIES GO A-THIEVING: MIDDLE CLASS SHOPLIFTERS IN THE VICTORIAN DEPARTMENT STORE (1989). 
23 PAUL STEEGE, BLACK MARKET, COLD WAR: EVERYDAY LIFE IN BERLIN, 1946-1949 33 (2007); Katie Lange, The Berlin Airlift: 
What It Was, Its Importance in the Cold War U.S. Dept. of Defense (June 25, 2018) 
https://www.defense.gov/Explore/Inside-DOD/Blog/Article/2062719/the-berlin-airlift-what-it-was-its-importance-
in-the-cold-war/.  
24 MALTE ZIERENBERG, BERLIN’S BLACK MARKET 1939-1950 127-186 (2015); MARK FENEMORE, FIGHTING THE COLD WAR IN POST-
BLOCKADE, POST-WALL BERLIN Ch. 6 - Ch. 7 (2019) 
25 Thesis of Alice Autumn Weinreb, Matters of Taste: The Politics of Food and Hunger in Divided Germany 1945-
1971 U. MICH. DEPT. OF HIST. 100-101 (2009)(“The remarkable scale of bartering, stealing, and gathering food stuffs 
throughout all four zones, and especially the almost universal participation in the black market, make clear that 
the rationing calories allotted German civilians were not the population’s only source of sustenance”).  
26 Richard Bessel, Policing in East Germany in the Wake of the Second World War 7 POLICING AND SOCIETY 1, 11; 14 
(2003) (“The unpopularity of the police is not accounted for only by unsatisfactory personnel policies, social 
difficulties and shortcomings...but also has its causes in the present-day economic situation of the population. The 
police very frequently are compelled to intervene against small-scale hoarders who are trying to improve their diet 
by buying additional food...these measures by the police are regarded as unjust”). 
27 Id. at 19. 
28 ANDRIE CHERNY, THE CANDY BOMBERS: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE BERLIN AIRLIFT AND AMERICA’S FINEST HOUR 434 (2008); 
Steege supra note 23 at 185. 
29 Id.; See also Steege supra note 23 at 14 (Explaining that economic crimes were situated at “the intersection of 
competing senses of entitlement, justice, legitimacy, and power that were all bound up with the daily struggle to 
meet individual supply needs”). 
30 Bessel supra note 26 at 14. 
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police.31 Under a justice system they perceived as more trustworthy, escaped East Berliners 
committed less crime.32 
 
 
 2. Disillusionment Expressed as Vigilantism 
 
 Frequently the disillusionment-induced lawlessness takes the form of vigilantism. As 
noted previously, current events illustrate this point. For example, many people saw the death 
of George Floyd, who was suffocated when an officer placed his knee on Floyd’s neck during his 
arrest, as symptomatic of the criminal justice system’s indifference to police wrongdoing 
against Blacks. Two activists summarized this view succinctly in a New York Times op-ed after 
Floyd’s death, writing, “The problem is that the entire criminal justice system gives police 
officers the power and opportunity to systematically harass and kill with impunity.”33 In the 
weeks that followed, police in many cities were targeted, including, for example, eleven St. 
Louis police officers who were shot at in five separate attacks.34 In Seattle, protesters attacked 
and firebombed a police station.35 In Compton, California, a man ambushed two officers who 
were sitting in their patrol car, shooting them both and injuring them severely.36 And in Los 
Angeles, a man walked into a police station and began firing wantonly at officers after 
pretending to seek assistance.37 
 But the same vigilante impulse is not limited to those who distrust the justice system for 
its perceived lawlessness; those who believe that the system to often tolerate lawlessness also 
have resorted to vigilante violence. For example, in the aftermath of Floyd’s death, several 
hundred protesters marching to the mayor’s house in St. Louis broke down a gate and 
trespassed on the property of Mark and Patricia McCloskey. Police and prosecutors had ignored 
many previous violent protests and did nothing to intervene on this occasion.38 The McCloskeys 
took it upon themselves to confront the group, he with an assault rifle and she with a 
 
31 Leslie Colitt, Escape From East Berlin GUARDIAN (Aug. 16, 2011) 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/16/escape-from-east-berlin.  
32   CHERNY supra note 26 at 475; Steege supra note 23 at 233; Mary Fulbrook, The State and the Transformation of 
Political Legitimacy in East and West Germany Since 1945 29 COMP. STUDIES IN SOCIETY & HIST. 211, 214-230 (1987). 
33 Philip McHarris & Thenjiwe McHarris, No More Money for the Police N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2020) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/opinion/george-floyd-police-funding.html. 
34 Christine Byers, “Nobody’s Safe in this City Right Now”: Six Police Officers Shot in St. Louis This Summer KSDK 
(Aug. 3, 2020) https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/crime/st-louis-police-officers-shot-summer-2020/63-
d01a9932-4769-47dc-9fa5-55283c1dd97c; Jim Salter, Police: 4 St. Louis Officers Hit by Gunfire During Protests  
ASSOC. PRESS (Jun. 2, 2020), https://www.fultonsun.com/news/local/story/2020/jun/02/missouri-protests-remain-
tense-in-kansas-city-st-louis/829410/.  
35 Tammy Mutasa, Seattle Rioters Caught on Camera Trying to Trap Police in East Precinct, Set it on Fire, KOMO 
NEWS REPORTER (Aug. 26th 2020) https://komonews.com/news/local/police-spokesperson-accuses-rioters-of-
attempted-murder-for-trying-to-barricade-officers.  
36 Elliot McLaughlin & Cheri Mossburg, Police Identify and Charge Man With Shooting Two Deputies, and He Was 
Already in Custody CNN (Sept. 30, 2020) https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/30/us/deonte-murray-compton-deputies-
shooting-suspect-arrest/index.html.  
37 Madeline Holcombe, LAPD Officer Injured After Shooting at Harbor Station CNN (Sept. 27, 2020) 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/27/us/lapd-harbor-shooting-officer-injured/index.html.  
38 Christine Byers, Charges Filed Against McCloskeys, St. Louis Couple Who Pointed Guns Toward Protesters, 
ST. LOUIS PUBLIC RADIO, (July 20, 2020), https://news.stlpublicradio.org/politics-issues/2020-07-20/charges-filed-
against-mccloskeys-st-louis-couple-who-pointed-guns-toward-protesters. (On the decision to charge the 
McCloskeys, St. Louis Circuit Attorney said: “We must protect the right to peacefully protest, and any attempt to 
chill it through intimidation will not be tolerated”).   
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semiautomatic handgun. They were charged with unlawful use of a weapon.39 Similarly, 17-
year-old Kyle Rittenhouse went to Kenosha to help protect a business that had been previously 
damaged by violent protesters because police and prosecutors had failed to act to prevent the 
violent protests.40 He took with him his AR-15 assault rifle, and shot and killed two people after 
they tried to wrestle his rifle out of his hands.41 Rittenhouse was charged with, among other 
things, first-degree intentional homicide.42 
 
 3. Empirical Studies Showing the Disillusionment-Noncompliance Dynamic  
 
 But one need not rely simply on common sense and anecdotal evidence to see the 
disillusionment-lawlessness connection. The dynamic is confirmed by controlled social 
psychology studies. The research suggests that the relationship between moral credibility and 
community deference and compliance is widespread and nuanced. Even small incremental 
losses in moral credibility can produce corresponding incremental losses in deference and 
compliance.43  
 Consider, for example, a study using a within-subjects design in which subjects were 
asked a number of questions relating to various ways in which moral credibility is thought to 
affect deference, compliance, and the internalization of the law’s norms. Will a citizen assist 
police by reporting a crime? Will they assist in the investigation and prosecution of a crime? Do 
people take the imposition of criminal liability and punishment as a reliable sign that the 
defendant has done something truly condemnable? Do people take the extent of the liability 
imposed as a reliable indication of the seriousness of the offense and the blameworthiness of 
the offender? With a baseline established on these issues, subjects were then disillusioned by 
exposing them to accounts of the system’s failures of justice and perpetrations of injustice. 
Later retesting showed that the measures of deference, compliance, and internalization of 
norms had all decreased among the disillusioned subjects.44  
 A follow-up study used a between-subjects design, giving different levels of 
disillusionment to three different groups and then testing their levels of deference, compliance, 
and internalization.45 The results confirm the conclusions of the earlier within-subjects design: 
The greater the disillusionment, the greater the loss in deference, compliance, and 
 
39 Jessica Lussenhop, Mark and Patricia McCloskey: What Really Went On in St. Louis That Day? BBC NEWS (Aug. 25, 
2020) https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2020-53891184; https://www.bbc.com/news/election-us-2020-
53891184.  
40 Pauleen Le, Fires, Chaos Erupts in Kenosha for a Second Night Following Jacob Blake Shooting, CBS58 (Aug. 25, 
2020) https://www.cbs58.com/news/fires-chaos-erupts-in-kenosha-in-second-night-following-jacob-blake-
shooting. 
41 Minyvonne Burke, Kyle Rittenhouse, Charged with Killing Two Kenosha Protesters Has Bond Set at $2M NBC NEWS 
(Nov. 3, 2020) https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/kyle-rittenhouse-charged-killing-2-kenosha-protesters-
has-bond-set-n1245953.  
42 Akane Otani, Who is Kyle Rittenhouse and What Happened in the Kenosha Shootings?, W.S.J. (Aug. 29, 2020) 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/who-is-kyle-rittenhouse-and-what-happened-in-the-kenosha-shootings-
11598653456; Yael Halon, Tucker Carlson Tonight AirsNever-Before-Seen Footage From Deadly Kenosha Shooting 
FOX NEWS (Sept. 22, 2020) https://www.foxnews.com/media/kenosha-shooting-new-footage-kyle-rittenhouse-
tucker. 
43 ROBINSON (2013) supra  note 1; Paul Robinson, Geoff Goodwin & Michael Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 85 





internalization. A third study analyzing responses in pre-existing large datasets came to a similar 
conclusion using regression analysis.46 
 The results in the studies are particularly striking because in each case, subjects came to 
the study with pre-existing views on the system’s reputation for being just. The experimenters, 
within the context of the study, could only nudge those pre-existing views slightly. Yet even that 
incremental disillusionment produced corresponding incremental reductions in deference and 
compliance. This is a particularly important finding because it means that no matter the current 
state of a criminal justice system’s moral credibility with the community, any incremental 
reduction in credibility can produce an incremental reduction in deference – and any increase 
can produce an increase in deference. Many other studies document the same point. 
 A 2002 study on the flouting thesis – the idea that the perceived justice of one law can 
influence compliance with unrelated laws – found that rules regarded as unjust have “subtle 
but pervasive influences on people’s deference to and respect for the law.”47 The experiment 
consisted of two parts. First, participants were exposed to a set of laws, which were chosen 
because of their apparent justness or unjustness.48 Exposure was conducted via newspaper 
stories, which varied in their discussion of civil forfeiture, income tax, and landlord/tenant laws 
so as to emphasize the fairness or unfairness of the proposed laws.49 Next, participants were 
told that they would be participating in a separate study in which they were asked to indicate 
their willingness to engage in particular types of future law breaking.50 These items included 
drunk driving, parking in a no-parking zone, failing to pay taxes, and drinking alcohol under age 
21.51 Non-compliance in the second study served as an indication of so-called “flouting” 
behavior.52  The study found that there was an overall trend for participants primed with unjust 
laws to demonstrate a higher probability of engaging in criminal behavior.53 That is, perceptions 
of an unjust law activated a more general attitude about the unjustness of the legal system, but 
this remained on an unconscious basis.54 
 A 2007 study using data from the European Union found that social willingness to 
comply with the law has significant positive effects on controlling traffic fatalities, outweighing 
even the influence of traffic exposure, speed, and alcohol consumption.55 The authors 
examined road safety data from 15 European countries and modeled the number of fatalities in 
terms of social willingness to comply, controlling for factors such as traffic exposure, vehicle 
fleet characteristics, road infrastructure and economic conditions, population characteristics 
and road user behavior.56  The authors found that social legitimacy is “a sine qua non for 
effective road safety policy because lack of public support will lead to insufficient willingness to 
comply and, in turn, more traffic fatalities.”57 Regardless of the specific content of the country’s 
 
46 Id. 
47 Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law: Does Perceived Injustice Provoke General Non-Compliance? NORTHWESTERN L. & 
ECON. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, No. 02-09 3 (2002). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=353745 
48 Id. at 9. 
49 Id. at 11. 
50 Id. at 9. 
51 Id. at 12. 
52 Id. at 9.  
53 Id. at 14. 
54 Id. at 28.  
55 Lode Vereeck & Klara Vrolix, The Social Willingness to Comply with the Law: The Effect of Social Attitudes on 
Traffic Fatalities 27 INT’L REV. OF L. & ECON. 385 (2007). 
56 Id. at 398. 
57 Id. at 402. 
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traffic laws, the law-abiding behavior of drivers was found to have a positive, measured effect 
on traffic fatalities.58 “The core idea of our paper is that social norms prevail over laws,” the 
authors explained.59 That is, the public’s allegiance to the law writ large – evidenced by their 
willingness or unwillingness to comply with the law – was simply more important than the 
effectiveness or ineffectiveness of specific traffic laws.60  
  A 2008 study of Swedes assessed whether there was a correlation between low 
institutional trust and illegal alcohol consumption.61 Alcohol consumption is a hotly contested 
topic in Sweden, and the Swedish national parliament has passed several laws intended to limit 
alcohol consumption. Sweden also has a state monopoly over alcohol sales. The authors of the 
study hypothesized that lower institutional trust “may be associated with high alcohol 
consumption” because “public institutions in Sweden are consistent and coherent in the way 
they view aspects such as high alcohol consumption.”62 The researchers asked respondents 
about their drinking habits probed their trust in various societal institutions. The results showed 
that lack of trust was associated with increased likelihood of harmful alcohol consumption. High 
trust in institutions, on the other hand, was correlated with a greater inclination to follow the 
advice of public officials, to trust in experts, and with steps to limit their own alcohol 
consumption.63 Ultimately, the study showed that those who do not doubt a particular 
institution’s legitimacy are more likely to heed that institution’s rules and recommendations. 
 A 2003 study on the reasons why taxpayers obey, rather than simply evade taxes, found 
that trust in the legal system had a strong effect on compliance.64 Based on survey data from 
Europe, the study’s authors asked respondents to rank whether they thought that cheating on 
taxes was “always justified,” “never justified,” or one of several options in the middle.65 They 
were also asked to rank how much confidence they had in the legal system on a scale of “a 
great deal of confidence,” “no confidence,” or somewhere in between.66 The study’s authors 
found that a perception of legitimacy in the legal system had a highly significant effect on so-
called “tax morale.”67 In fact, an increase in the trust scale of just one unit, increased the 
subjects’ likelihood to find cheating on taxes to be unjustified by 3.5 percentage points.68 “Trust 
in the legal system leads to acceptance of governments’ decisions and produces the incentive 
to obey the rules,” the authors found.69 Furthermore, where the public believed that officials 
were honest and competent – measured by their ranking of agreement with the statement 
“Public officials can usually be trusted to do what’s right” – willingness to comply with tax 
payments increased further.70 Ultimately, the study suggested that rather than focusing on 
enforcement, governments concerned with cultivating “tax morale” should try to create 
confidence in the legal system and in the trustworthiness and capacity of tax officials. 
 
58 Id. at 386. 
59 Id. at 402. 
60 Id.  
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Health Survey 2006, 8 BMC PUBLIC HEALTH 283 (2008). 
62 Id. at 284. 
63 Id. at 290. 
64 Benno Torgler, Tax Morale, Rule Governed Behavior and Trust 14 CONST. POL. ECON. 119 (2003). 
65 Id. at 134. 
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 137. 
69 Id.  
70 Id.  
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 A 2009 study used survey data from a number of African countries to model the 
relationship between perceptions that a government was fair and trustworthy and beliefs that 
such a government deserves deference to its rules.71 The authors focused on those factors that 
they believed would induce “voluntary deference to the directives of authorities and rules 
precisely because they are believed legitimate.”72 The data used in the study was collected 
through a survey of more than 23,000 respondents across 18 countries modeled in an effort to 
capture citizens’ legitimating beliefs in terms of their willingness to obey the police, courts, and 
the tax department.73 The survey asked respondents the degrees to which they believed 
administrators were corrupt, authorities were capable of detecting and punishing crime, and 
the government treated citizens fairly.74  Standard sociodemographic variables that can affect 
citizens’ acceptance of government authority were controlled for, including age and household 
income.75 The authors found considerable evidence of a link between the perceived 
trustworthiness of government and criminal justice mechanisms and citizens’ willingness to 
defer to these institutions.76 The results indicated that “the more trustworthy and fair the 
government, the more likely its population will develop legitimating beliefs that lead them to 
accept the government’s right to make people obey its laws and regulations.”77 
 Notice that these last several studies tested not only the effect of people’s perceptions 
of the justness of the criminal law’s rules and dispositions but also its fairness in adjudicating 
cases and the trustworthiness and legitimacy of the government generally. There exists a 
separate literature on the latter, the fairness of the process (apart from the justness of the 
results). Natural experiments and empirical studies on these issues are relevant to our present 
purpose because they confirm that the criminal justice system’s reputation can have significant 
real-world effects in gaining compliance. Consider some of the evidence supporting this 
conclusion. 
 
 4. Natural Experiments on Law Enforcement Legitimacy and Compliance  
 
 There exists a host of natural experiments demonstrating the connection between 
compliance and a criminal justice system’s reputation for law enforcement legitimacy. Consider 
several examples. 
 The relationship between the police and the public in Nigeria presents something of an 
extreme case of unprofessional policing leading to diminished compliance. The police in Nigeria 
have been notoriously corrupt since the turn of the 21st century.78 According to several reports, 
the Nigerian police often extort money from the public at taxi stands, marketplaces, and 
roadblocks. When citizens fail to pay the bribes, they are sometimes beaten, sexually assaulted, 
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or shot. Further, the police often neglect to perform their basic duties unless they are bribed.79 
Crimes are not investigated unless the victim is able to persuade the police to act. Officers at 
the upper echelons of the police force are widely known to siphon off significant portions of 
public funds for their personal uses.80 A survey of Nigerian public opinion regarding police 
legitimacy found that a plurality of Nigerians expressed having “no confidence” in the police.81 
Another found that Nigeria is plagued by “low levels of citizen cooperation with the police”82 
and “a loss of confidence of the common man in the criminal justice system.”83 Interviews 
reflected widespread distrust of the Nigerian police. One woman reported, “Any witness or 
crime victim who approaches the police without bearing in mind their lack of integrity and 
possible complicity in crime may end up becoming the criminal. The police doubt everything 
about you.”84 As a result of this distrust, crime throughout Nigeria has increased. Analyses of 
crime data between 1999 and 2013 show that murder, armed robbery, and assault have 
increased dramatically during this period even as the Nigerian police have received more and 
more resources from the state.85 In fact, some members of the Nigerian public have taken the 
law into their own hands by lynching suspects of crimes or by flouting the law altogether with 
shoplifting, car thefts, fraud schemes, and computer crimes.86 Ultimately, crime has only 
become more widespread and more diverse in Nigeria as the police have become more corrupt, 
unprofessional, and ineffective in their practices. 
 After the shooting of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, an investigation found that 
Ferguson’s policing practices led to distrust and resentment among many in the Ferguson 
community, which is 67 percent African American. The report explained, “African Americans’ 
views of FPD are shaped not just by what FPD officers do, but how they do it.” Dozens of 
Ferguson residents told of officers cursing at them, verbally harassing them, and randomly 
brandishing their weapons in threatening ways.87 Crime rates in Ferguson rose precipitously 
after the shooting. While some of this may have been due to reduced police intervention, the 
so-called “Ferguson effect,” one study suggests that a major contributor was the dramatic loss 
in police legitimacy crystallized by the Michael Brown killing and the protests that followed it.88 
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 A loss of reputation of the criminal justice system can undermine compliance even when 
that loss stems from a perception of governmental illegitimacy apart from unfair criminal 
justice adjudication procedures or unprofessional police. Consider several natural experiments. 
 In 2003, then Mexico City mayor Manuel Lopez Obrador and billionaire Carlos Slim 
combined efforts to reduce crime in one of Mexico City’s most notoriously lawless 
neighborhoods called Tepito.89 The pair invested millions in surveillance technology and 
increased policing in order to curb the violence, drug trafficking, and sale of stolen or 
counterfeit goods.90 Most notably, they relied on the help of a former New York City mayor  
whose private security firm provided high definition “hawkeye” surveillance cameras to 
monitor the goings on of the neighborhood and employed former New York City Police 
Department officers to train their Mexican counterparts.91 Residents of the neighborhood, 
including those who were not involved in any sort of criminal group, resisted. Feeling as though 
they were being policed by Americans, as opposed to their own countrymen, they viewed the 
neighborhood’s security system as wholly illegitimate.92 In 2004, crime in the area increased by 
25 percent.93 Tepitans took part in a variety of activities that actively interfered with the new 
police procedures. Eventually, the Mexican government realized that the perceived illegitimacy 
of their new enforcement mechanisms was doing more harm than good and decided to sever 
ties with the American security personnel.94 
 Similarly, consider the experiences of various Native American tribes whose tribal justice 
systems conflicted with the federal criminal justice system. The federal government had 
previously allowed tribes to have criminal justice jurisdiction on their reservations,95 but in 
1953 Congress passed Public Law 280 allowing states to decide whether to assume complete or 
partial jurisdiction over crimes by or against Native Americans on reservations.96 The law was 
viewed as an affront to tribal sovereignty, failing to recognize Native Americans’ status as 
members of domestic sovereign nations, and stifling the effectiveness of tribal courts.97 Over 
the following decades, Native Americans developed increasingly negative views of the non-
Native American criminal justice system, stemming from widespread distrust of the instruments 
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of justice implemented by the federal government.98 As views became more negative, crime 
soared.99 
 The situation of Northern Ireland in the 1970s provides another example of the 
connection between perceived legitimacy and increased crime. As tensions rose between 
Catholics who wanted a united Ireland, and Protestants who claimed allegiance to the United 
Kingdom, violence escalated.100 In 1972, the British government suspended the Northern 
Ireland parliament and instituted direct rule from the U.K., replacing Irish criminal justice 
policies with their own. Law enforcement powers were expanded enormously, allowing for the 
indefinite detention of suspects without trial, juryless courts in cases of alleged terrorism, and 
increased police and army powers. The British police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary, was 
widely perceived as unfairly partial to Protestant Loyalists and unaccountable to, and 
discriminatory against, Catholic Unionists. As two criminologists observed, “the costs in terms 
of negative effects on public trust in British institutions have been incalculable.”101 Politically 
motivated crimes increased with the rise in political tensions, but so did crimes unrelated to 
political action. As a result of this perceived illegitimacy, throughout the 1970s, the levels of 
recorded crime increased nearly sixfold.102 Murders rose rapidly, but property crime increased 
at an even higher rate during this period.103 The burglary rate increased by a factor of fifteen, 
and drug dealing rose exponentially.104 As the Irish populace became more disaffected and 
distrusting of the influence of the Royal Ulster Constabulary, they expressed their 
disillusionment by – among other things – committing more crime.105 
 
 5. Empirical Studies on the Law Enforcement Legitimacy-Compliance Dynamic 
 
 But one need not rely only on these natural experiments for evidence of the connection 
between criminal justice legitimacy and compliance, for there is also a strong body of empirical 
evidence in support.  
 Most compelling here is the work of Tom Tyler.106 Fair adjudication rules and police 
professionalism promote what he terms the criminal justice system’s “legitimacy,” as opposed 
to the justness of the liability and punishment rules that promote what Robinson calls the 
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system’s “moral credibility.”107 The two sorts of claims are analogous in that they both suggest 
that the criminal justice system’s reputation can have real world effects on compliance rates.108 
 Tyler and a colleague found that people were willing to voluntarily accept the decisions 
of judges where those decisions appeared both neutral and respectful.109 If the decision-making 
process appeared to lack bias, focus on objective facts, recognize citizen rights, and treat 
people with dignity, then people were more likely to defer to the decisions of legal authorities. 
“People depend heavily upon their inferences about the intentions of the authority,” the 
authors wrote. “If the authorities are viewed as having acted out of a sincere and benevolent 
concern for those involved, people infer that the authorities’ actions were fair.”110  
Similarly, Tyler has found that law-abiding behavior can be encouraged where police 
exercise their authority over citizens through fair processes and with appropriate respect. In a 
study of adults in Chicago, for example, Tyler assessed the independent impact on compliance 
of people’s perceptions of a variety of factors, including felt obligation to obey the law and 
allegiance to, or support for, the relevant authority.111 These two factors – which roughly 
encapsulated perceived legitimacy of the justice system – were the single most important 
determinants in people’s deference to the law. Similarly, in a study of 1,656 adults in Oakland 
and Los Angeles, Tyler found that 30 percent of the variance in subjects’ overall assessment of 
the justice system’s legitimacy was derived from perceptions of their own interactions with the 
police. Ultimately, both studies suggest that the divergence between people’s perceptions of 
how the police should act versus their perceptions of how the police actually act is one of the 
most important indicators of law-abiding behavior.112 113    
 This same effect is seen cross culturally. In a study of South Korean adults, researchers 
found that a perceived just distribution of punishment was one of the strongest predictors of 
compliance with the law.114 The study used data from surveys questioning citizens’ attitudes 
and opinions towards the police and comparing it to their willingness to cooperate with law 
enforcement. The justness of police decisions was measured by asking whether pedestrian 
stops, traffic stops, and arrests were allocated in a just and unbiased manner. The survey found 
that respondents who perceived the police as allocating outcomes fairly were more likely to 
comply than those who view the police as unjust in their dealings.115 An Australian study came 
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to a similar conclusion, finding that people who viewed the police as delivering fair outcomes 
were more compliant towards law enforcement than those who did not.116 
 
 6. Conclusion 
 
 The evidence reported in the above subsections confirm the common-sense notion that 
the reduction in the criminal law’s reputation for being a reliable moral authority will 
correspondingly reduce people’s willingness to defer to it, to comply with its demands, and to 
internalize its norms. A host of real-world case examples have been given, including American 
Prohibition, notorious corruption in turn-of-the-century New York, overly aggressive policing 
and over-punishment in 1960s Watts, Cold War divided Berlin, the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
and the anti-mask movement of the 1918 Spanish Flu. Where the community critique of the 
criminal justice system focuses on its failures of justice, those failures can spark vigilantism, as 
in the anti-police violence after the death of George Floyd, and in the anti-protester conduct of 
the McCloskeys and Kyle Rittenhouse. Even more compelling, however, may be the significant 
collection of controlled empirical studies, both in the United States and overseas, 
demonstrating the relationship between the criminal justice system’s moral credibility with the 
community and its ability to gain compliance, deference, and internalization.  
 
B. A Response to Critics 
 
 Some critics argue that there is little empirical evidence that reduction in the moral 
credibility of the criminal law with the community will have an effect in reducing compliance.117 
But this criticism simply ignores the existing evidence recounted in the previous section: the 
empirical studies that show a clear connection between reduced moral credibility and reduced 
compliance; the large collection of natural experiments that show this dynamic at work in the 
real world in a wide variety of situations with a wide variety of people from different cultures; 
and the empirical research and real-world case studies by social psychologists like Tom Tyler 
documenting an analogous dynamic between the system’s reputation for fair adjudication and 
police professionalism as affecting compliance. There is also an element of common sense to 
this dynamic given what is understood about human nature. History is filled with examples of 
revolt and rebellion against unfair and illegitimate rule. Why would the system’s loss of moral 
credibility with the community not result in less deference to it? Any assumption to the 
contrary would imply that people will happily consent to being governed by authorities they 
view as unjust. The critics have some work to do to discredit all of this evidence. What is their 
alternative explanation for the results in the empirical studies supporting the credibility-
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Individual Prevention, and Limiting Retributivism 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 312, 340 (2014) 
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compliance dynamic? For the results in the natural experiments? Since many are denying the 
link between the criminal justice system’s reputation and citizen compliance generally, they 
also need to provide an alternative explanation for the legitimacy-compliance dynamic shown 
in the “legitimacy” empirical studies and natural experiments. 
 Some critics point out that the research shows only a reduction in an intention to 
comply, not actual reduced compliance.118 Again, this simply ignores the existing evidence. It is 
true that social psychologists have not, and probably never will, be able to create and conduct a 
controlled experiment to show the dynamic. Few governments are likely to let the 
experimenters take over their criminal justice system in order to degrade its moral credibility in 
order to confirm an increase in lawlessness. However, we already have a large collection of 
natural experiments where a criminal justice system’s reputation has, because of current 
events, noticeably increased or decreased its moral credibility with a resulting show of 
corresponding change in compliance.119  
 Other critics suggest that any reduced compliance is likely to be limited to the particular 
offense that the community sees as improper.120 Yet again, this is simply contrary to the 
existing evidence. The empirical studies show that criminal liability or punishment perceived as 
unjust makes subjects less willing to give deference, for example, by reporting a different 
offense or interpreting conviction for a different offense as suggesting the conduct is 
condemnable.121 Further, this criticism also conflicts with the natural experiments described, in 
which the system’s loss of moral credibility in one area of criminality increases crime rates and 
other related areas.122 
 Some critics argue that the effect of reduced compliance only occurs where there is a 
dramatic reduction in moral credibility.123 But this criticism is inconsistent with the empirical 
data that shows that the relationship between moral credibility and compliance is not a step 
function with trigger points but rather a continuous function: a marginal reduction in moral 
 
118 See Roberts & de Keijser supra note 2 at 489-490 (arguing that all variables are measures of attitudes and 
behavioral intentions, whereas the claim involves people’s behavior in response to the law and effectiveness of the 
criminal justice system: “The reported studies measured subjects’ respect for the law, and their behavioral 
intentions to cooperate, support, and comply with the law. As such, these studies, on which the book’s claims rest, 
remain at the level of attitudes and behavioral intentions of small samples of subjects undergoing experimental 
manipulations...In short, there is insufficient evidence for the effectiveness claims of empirical desert. Studies 
which measure actual behavior, not merely behavior intentions are necessary”).  
119 See supra Part II(A)(4), Part II(A)(2). 
120 See Rappaport supra note 2 at 806-807 (arguing that evidence for compliance effects of empirical desert is 
shaky because even though research indicates that people will be more willing to comply with a particular law that 
aligns more closely with their views, it does not necessarily indicate that people will comply with the law more 
generally: “In nearly all of the prior work Robinson cites, researchers investigated whether a law’s moral credibility 
affects the stated likelihood of compliance with that law, not with the law more generally...Existing research does 
not distinguish between the credibility of outcomes in individual cases and that of the system as a whole. In other 
words, the data do not show whether people regard a system as morally credible when outcomes an in individual 
cases are perceived as just but the systemic effects are not. After all, sentences are not the only systemic input 
that matters – budgets, police and prosecutorial discretion, and a host of other factors unrelated to sentencing go 
far toward determining how much punishment the system doles out and to whom”).  
121 See supra Part II(A)(5). 
122 See supra Part II(A)(2), PartII(A)(4). 
123 See Simons supra note 2 at 662 (arguing, “It does not follow that the failure of states to conform their criminal 
legislation to their own constituents’ views will perceptibly undermine compliance with the law. It might turn out 
that so long as the major corpus of the criminal law in each state is in very rough accord with its citizens’ values, 




credibility will produce a corresponding marginal reduction in compliance.124 When subjects 
come into the laboratory, they have already formed some view about the criminal justice 
system’s reputation, based upon lots of exposure to media accounts, conversations with other 
people, etc. In the period of time that the researcher has them in the laboratory, the best the 
researcher can hope to do is to nudge that view of the system in one direction or another. Yet, 
the evidence shows that even this minor nudge results in a noticeable shift in the subjects’ 
willingness to comply, defer, and internalize. We know from empirical studies that ordinary 
people have extremely nuanced judgments of relative blameworthiness.125 It is not 
unreasonable to speculate that a person’s real-world exposure to a case they see as moderately 
disproportionate could provide as much of a nudge as the social scientist can provide by 
exposing the person to a case of greater disproportionality in a social psychology laboratory. 
Given subjects’ nuanced judgments of disproportionality, any disproportionality will contribute 
to their overall judgment of the system and, as noted above, there is not some trigger point at 
which the effect occurs but rather a continuous function in which an incremental reduction in 
credibility produces an incremental reduction in compliance. 
 Other critics suggest that if conflict with community views really undermines 
compliance, then the criminal justice system should have collapsed by now or should at least 
show signs that it is headed for collapse.126 Again, this ignores the continuous function 
relationship between moral credibility and compliance. It is not the case that any reduction in 
moral credibility will cause the criminal justice system to collapse. An incremental reduction in 
reputation simply creates a corresponding incremental reduction in compliance.127 Whatever 
the state of one’s criminal justice system at the moment, there is always value in attempting to 
 
124 See supra Part II(A)(5). 
125 Paul Robinson, Geoff Goodwin & Michael Reisig, The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1940 (2010); Paul 
Robinson & John Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and Justice Policy, 81 SOUTHERN CAL. L. 
REV., 1-67 (2007); Paul Robinson & John Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NORTHWESTERN U. L. REV. 453 (1998). 
126 See Roberts & de Keijser supra note 2 at 488 (arguing that there is no evidence that large segments of the 
community are deeply dissatisfied with the criminal justice system or that their dissatisfaction plays out in terms of 
their compliance with the law: “Our first question is whether the strong form of his argument is overstated. The 
arguments for empirical desert appear intuitively attractive. The argument predicts that without connecting to 
shared community intuitions the criminal justice system’s moral credibility will continue to decline, eventually 
leading to system failure. From an empirical point of view, this claim is problematic because it cannot be falsified 
by looking at existing criminal justice systems – which have yet to collapse. Why, in light of long-standing public 
criticism, have existing systems not yet lost all their moral credibility and collapsed? One answer may be that they 
are on the brink of collapse and it is simply a matter of time until the moral credibility reservoir is completely 
drained. The alternative explanation is that existing criminal justice systems already incorporate popular opinion in 
more diffuse and indirect ways, at least to the extent that it has protected the systems against total loss of moral 
credibility....Moreover, there is a marked and fundamental difference between observing that the community 
views will be detrimental to the moral credibility and effectiveness of the justice system. Similarly, focusing on 
justificatory defenses (i.e. self-defense), Robinson concludes from one of his scenario studies that striking 
differences between community views and the criminal law indicate that large segments of the community are 
‘deeply dissatisfied with the criminal justice system’. While the observation of a marked difference may be the 
result of empirical research, the stated implication is not”). Roberts and de Keijser challenge this notion, saying, 
“From an empirical point of view, this claim is problematic because it cannot be falsified by looking at existing 
criminal justice systems – which have yet to collapse. Why, in light of long-standing public criticism, have existing 
systems not yet lost all their moral credibility and collapsed? One answer may be that they are on the brink of 
collapse and it is simply a matter of time until the moral credibility is completely drained. The alternative 
explanation is that existing criminal justice systems already incorporate popular opinion in more diffuse and 
indirect ways, at least to the extent that it has protected the systems against a total loss of moral credibility.”  
127 See supra Part II(A)(6). 
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improve its moral credibility, and there is always a compliance cost in letting its moral 
credibility slip. 
 Some critics point out that the empirical research suggests a mild reduction in 
compliance only upon exposing subjects to grossly disproportionate sentences, and thus, these 
critics suggest that there would be little real-world reduction in compliance from the run-of-
the-mill disproportionality more common in the system.128 This view is misguided because it 
assumes that people in the real world would not be exposed to grossly disproportionate 
punishments like those used in the studies. In fact, the empirical studies identify a significant 
list of common criminal law doctrines that regularly produce what the community sees as 
disproportionate punishment: three strikes, felony murder, high penalties for drug offenses, 
strict liability, adult prosecution of juveniles, criminalizing regulatory violations, and narrowing 
the insanity defense.129 Further, many of the natural experiments don’t involve some 
particularly grossly disproportionate shocking case but rather a continuing stream of lesser 
disproportionality’s, which end up having the cumulative effect of reducing moral credibility 
and thereby increasing crime.130 
  Some critics apparently concede that reduced moral credibility will lead to some 
reduction in compliance but argue that it would take more research to determine how much of 
a reduction it would create. Without this further research, such critics argue, we cannot 
determine whether this crime-control mechanism would provide better or worse crime-control 
than alternative distributive principles such as incapacitation of the dangerous or general 
deterrence.131 This is an important point, for if the justification for adopting maximizing moral 
 
128 See Rappaport supra note 2 at 807 (arguing that evidence detects only slight anticipated compliance effects 
from massively unjust sentences. We can presume that little to no effect would arise from mild injustices and their 
associated diminution of moral credibility: “Robinson’s own studies present lay participants with vignettes 
involving criminal sentences that, by conjecture, are grossly disproportionate to anticipated views of just desert. 
Learning of these sentences, Robinson finds, reduces participants’ expressed willingness to comply and cooperate 
with the law. Yet Robinson detects only slight anticipated compliance effects from massively unjust sentences, 
such as a fifty-year sentence for a nineteen-year-old who reasonably believed the minor with whom he had 
consensual sex was an adult”). See also Slobogin supra note 2 at 378 (arguing “Robinson appears to hold that 
failing to subscribe to empirical desert in most cases will result in noticeable disutility, whereas I am inclined to 
believe, in line with studies reported in Putting Desert in Its Place, that only significant, continuous, and highly 
publicized departures from law views will occasion the loss of compliance, cooperation, and respect that Robinson 
describes. People get upset about all sorts of things the government does – from Obamacare and surveillance to 
gun control and abortion. Changing the official stance on controversial issues to appease one group is likely to 
upset another. Whether the focus is criminal matters or something else, most people will not take their 
disgruntlement out on the system or on others, and those who do will be roughly equal in number regardless of 
which position government adopts”). (PHR: at some point we need to address the study that Slobogin published in 
the article that he cites here. It may be that we need not say anything more than that we have published a 
response to it that demonstrates that flaws in the study design and methodology mean that his results do not say 
what he claims they say, but instead serve to support our conclusions rather than to undermine them.  
Paul Robinson et al., Empirical Desert, Individual Prevention, and Limiting Retributivism 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 312, 
340 (2014) 
129 See ROBINSON, (2013) supra note 1 at page 120. 
130 See supra Part II(A)(2) (Watts, Prohibition, Vietnam War, etc.). 
131 See Kolber supra note 2 at 452 (explaining empirical desert advocates have yet to show how much compliance 
empirical desert can induce. We do not know if there are good consequentialist grounds for adopting potentially 
costly empirical desert policies: “We cannot use social science surveys alone to determine how much compliance 
empirical desert will generate. To do that, we would have to engage in the very difficult process of monitoring and 
analyzing the effects that empirical desert policies have on compliance behavior. We can use surveys to test short-
term effects of people’s beliefs about the law on their reported willingness to comply with the law. But such 
studies will still be a far cry from delivering the sort of real-world data we would need in order to estimate 
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credibility as a distributive principle is its crime-control advantages, then this comparison to 
other crime-control distributive principles is essential. This is the subject of Part VI, which 
concludes that the greatest strength of maximizing moral credibility as a distributive principle 
may be the weaknesses, sometimes disqualifying, of alternative crime-control principles. 
 
III. The Determinants of Moral Credibility 
  
 Part II has shown that reduced moral credibility tends to reduce compliance, deference, 
and internalization. But one may ask: What determines the criminal law’s moral credibility with 
the community? There are many aspects of the criminal justice system that contribute to its 
reputation, including, as noted above with regard to Tom Tyler’s “legitimacy” research, the 
fairness of its adjudication procedures and the professionalism of its police. Our focus here is 
on its criminal law rules. What should be the distributive principle for criminal liability and 
punishment rules that will best promote and protect the criminal law’s moral credibility? We 
argue that typically this can best be done by rules that minimize criminal law’s conflicts with the 
community’s justice judgments. 
 
A. Criminal Law’s Regular Conflicts with Community Views as Undermining Its Moral 
Credibility 
 
 We know from empirical studies that ordinary people think of criminal liability and 
punishment in terms of desert – offenders should get the punishment they deserve rather than, 
for example, the punishment that might best deter others or might best incapacitate dangerous 
offenders. Consider, for example, two empirical studies that explicitly tested the factors that 
drive ordinary people’s criminal liability and punishment judgments. 
 One study focused on whether ordinary people thought general deterrence or just 
deserts was the proper basis for imposing criminal liability and punishment.132 Participants 
were given short vignettes of harmdoing, which varied factors of the harmdoing that could 
affect the sentence.133 Subjects were then asked to recommend a punishment severity on two 
scales, ranging from not at all severe to extremely severe, and then not guilty to life 
sentence.134 The degree to which his or her sentence recommendation was influenced by each 
of the factors of wrongdoing provides a clue to the respondent’s underlying motivation for the 
punishment given. The variables used that would have a significant influence on a general 
deterrence distribution of criminal liability and punishment included the seriousness of the 
offense, the difficulty of detecting the particular type of crime, and in the publicity that the 
sentence received. These variables are all highly relevant in assessing liability and punishment 
based upon general deterrence.135 The variables used that would be highly relevant to a desert 
distribution included the seriousness of the offense, conditions of moral mitigation, such as, for 
example, whether or not the offender expressed remorse, and whether or not the offender 
 
compliance induced by real-world empirical desert policies. Therefore, we cannot operationalize empirical desert 
as part of a consequentialist punishment system until we can better estimate how much compliance empirical 
desert policies induce”). 
132 Kevin Carlsmith, John Darley & Paul Robinson, Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as Motives for 
Punishment 83 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCH. 284, 284 (2002). 
133 Id. at 287-289. 
134 Id. at 289. 
135 Id. at 288-289. 
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committed her crime for ostensibly noble purposes.136 Several studies were conducted using 
these basic parameters, controlling for various components to determine the validity of the 
results.137 In their responses, participants appeared insensitive to general deterrence factors 
but highly sensitive to blameworthiness factors.138 Although participants expressed support for 
deterrence as a general goal of having criminal justice system on an abstract level, they failed to 
assign punishment in a way that was consistent with it as a distributive principle for criminal 
liability and punishment. 
 Another study tested whether ordinary people are more inclined to assign criminal 
liability and punishment according to just deserts criteria or to look to criteria relevant to the 
incapacitation of dangerous persons.139 Subjects in the study were given descriptions of a 
variety of harm-doing actions and were asked to assign punishments, using a 7-point Likert-type 
scale that asked for severity of punishment, and a more elaborate 13-point scale that provided 
actual prison sentences.140 In the various vignettes, the seriousness of the crime as well as the 
likelihood that the actor would commit other harms in the future, were altered.141 The authors 
examined the weights that people placed on just deserts or incapacitation considerations as 
they assigned punishments to wrongdoers.142 The results indicated that respondents’ natural 
inclinations more closely resembled just deserts judgements than incapacitation judgments.143 
The seriousness of the act, indexed in large part by the degree of moral outrage it provokes, 
determined the degree of punishment respondents assigned for the offense.144 
 In a second part of the study, respondents were given three test cases to determine 
whether respondents would be willing to incapacitate a dangerous offender rather than to 
assign him a just deserts punishment.145 In each case, a previously mild-mannered individual 
attacked and killed another person. In the control case, the actor killed out of a work-related 
jealousy; in another case, the actor killed a stranger because a previously undiscovered brain 
tumor caused the violent act, but the brain tumor was inoperable; and in the last case, the 
tumor was operable, so the individual was expected to become less dangerous if he received 
treatment. After reading the vignettes about the three offenders, the subjects were asked 
whether they would recommend incarceration in a prison, in a mental hospital, or whether 
they would set the person free.146 In the jealous rage case, a strong majority of subjects (86 %) 
would send the offender to prison, as desert would require. In the brain tumor cases, where a 
majority of respondents saw the tumor is responsible for the offense rather than the actor, few 
subjects would send the offender to prison, whether the tumor was inoperable (7 %) or 
operable (21 %).147 In other words, the vast majority of respondents again saw criminal 
punishment (prison) as appropriate only where they saw the offender as blameworthy for the 
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offense; dangerousness might be appropriate to civilly commit the person to an institution but 
could not be used as a basis for criminal liability and punishment. 
 In one study from 2006, researchers found that people are intuitively drawn to desert 
(“retributive”)-related information.148 In that study, subjects were given vignettes of crime and 
were presented with different categories of information about that crime – some with a desert 
bent, some with a deterrence bent, and some with an incapacitation bent.149 A whopping 97 
percent of subjects chose to consult desert-related information rather deterrence-related 
information or incapacitation-related information.150 When, on a second survey, the same 
subjects were asked to sentence the offender and rate the confidence of their choices, those 
who had consulted desert materials were substantially more confident in their sentencing 
decisions, while those who consulted general deterrence or incapacitation materials exhibited 
far less confidence, indicating that they believed they had made poor choices.151 Thus, desert 
instincts prevailed as the strongest and most comfortably intuitive for the subjects. 
 In another study from 2006, a narrower examination of people’s desert impulses found 
that people are unlikely to endorse a system of restorative justice that lacks retributive 
features.152 The study asked subjects to read vignettes of crimes and assign the offenders to 
one of three courts.153 The first court was purely restorative, with no punitive elements; the 
second court was mixed; and the third was desert-based only. The authors of the study found 
that people generally ascribed punishment according to desert principles. For higher levels of 
offending such as attempted rape or murder, none of the respondents accepted a purely 
restorative system.154 As the authors explained, “These findings suggest that in order for 
citizens to view a restorative justice procedure as an acceptable alternative to the traditional 
court system for serious crimes, the procedure must allow for the option of some retributive 
measures.”155  
In a 2008 study, researchers found that self-reported justifications for punishment bear 
little relation to actual punishment-related behavior, underlying most people’s subconcious 
inclination to punish along desert grounds.156 Participants completed an anonymous online 
experimental survey in which they were asked to sentence offenders based on varying 
vignettes and give reasons for their sentences.157 Some scenarios were manipulated to 
encourage the participant to think about desert, while others were manipulated to encourage 
the participant to think about deterrence.158 Participants then completed two further surveys, 
which assessed each participant’s endorsement of  desert, deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation.159 The results showed that people’s self-reported punishment justifications did 
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not at all align with their actual punishment-related decisions.160 Even though people expressed 
support for deterrence-related or incapacitation policies, they abandoned these policies as 
soon as they realized that such policies failed to track blameworthiness proportionality.161  
 It seems clear from this research that ordinary people normally expect and want 
criminal liability and punishment to be distributed according to an offender’s just desert, rather 
than according to principles of general deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous. Thus, 
where offenders are over-punished or under-punished in regards to laypeople’s intuitions of a 
just desert-based punishment, one would expect laypeople to view the punishment as unjust. 
 Given the studies showing people's expectations and desires for the distribution of 
criminal liability and punishment, do criminal law rules that regularly conflict with the 
community’s justice judgments, by doing injustice or by failing to do justice, undermine the 
criminal law’s moral credibility? Again, the answer seems a matter of common sense. How 
could repeated conflicts with the community’s shared principles of justice not reduce the law’s 
credibility with the community?  
 Once again, though, we need not rely strictly on common sense because social 
psychology studies clearly confirm this dynamic. Some of the studies described above in Part 
II.A have already addressed this issue. For example, the “disillusionment” condition in the 
studies were sometimes created, quite successfully, by having subjects read about real-world 
cases in which the criminal law rules produced results that conflicted with community justice 
judgments. The studies did not assume that exposing the subjects to cases that conflicted with 
their justice judgments undermined the systems moral credibility with them. They actually 
tested for and measured the loss in moral credibility.162 
 In a 1986 study, researchers interviewed more than one thousand prison inmates and 
asked them about their perceptions of the fairness of the criminal justice system’s outcomes.163 
The researchers defined such distributive fairness as “the perception that the outcome is 
deserved when judged not in relation to the amount of harm done, but rather in relation to the 
comparisons between one’s own outcome and the outcomes incurred by others.”164 The 
inmates were asked to rate the fairness of their sentences on five-point Likert scales from “very 
fair” to “very unfair.”165 The researchers found that perceived unfairness resulting from 
informal and discretionary procedures called the justice system’s credibility into question.166 
Most notably, the inmates’ belief that they had been sentenced fairly was more closely tied to 
their perception of the legitimacy of the justice system than the actual magnitude of the 
sentence received.167 As the researchers explained, “routine departures from legalistic 
principles of due process create in the consumer a sense of injustice that undermines the 
legitimacy of legal authorities and thereby allows justification for past criminal activity and 
increases the likelihood of future criminality.”168 
In a similar 1988 study, researchers interviewed hundreds male defendants charged 
with felonies shortly after their arrest and after the disposition of their case in order to 
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determine what factors most strongly influenced their perceptions of their satisfaction with the 
outcome of their case.169 The sentences received by the men ranged from time served to a 
prison term.170 The men were asked about the severity of their sentence, which was measured 
by the researchers in terms of three factors: months incarcerated, sentence type, and deviation 
from expected sentence.171 This estimation of severity was compared with the results of 
questions regarding distributive justice – focusing on the defendant’s evaluation of how his 
sentence compared with those of similar defendants convicted of the same crime – as well as 
procedural justice – focusing on the defendants’ perceptions of the fairness of the process by 
which he was treated.172 The study found that the defendants had more confidence in the 
outcome of their case and trust inthe criminal justice system where they felt that their sentence 
was fair.173   
 In a 1972 study, dozens of defendants were interviewed researchers about their 
perceptions of fairness of the sentences they received.174 The study found that the defendants 
focused most intently on the process of plea bargaining, specifically making the best possible 
bargain and arranging a quick release.175 The defendants felt that the plea bargain exemplified 
the “lying” and “deceitfulness” of the system writ large because sentencing depended not on 
deterrence, or rehabilitation, or retribution, but rather on the “way the bargaining game is 
played.”176 They told researchers that using the plea bargain they felt that the justice system 
was just “a game to be played” or a “ritual” to be performed where the smart defendants were 
able to totally evade punishment. Plea bargaining made the men were distrustful of the system 
because it reminded them of the criminal environments where many of the men came from.177 
The author of the study concluded that the effect of plea bargaining was to undercut the moral 
authority of the criminal justice system and contribute to defendant cynicism.178  
 Several studies make an analogous point in the context of establishing or undermining 
the legitimacy of police. In 2008, Meares et al., for example, conducted a nationwide study on 
how the public judges the appropriateness of police conduct.179 (Greater perceived legitimacy, 
recall, produces greater compliance.) One component of the study was a questionnaire 
revolving around citizens’ perceptions and evaluations of police-citizen encounters from their 
own experience. Another component was an experimental design testing citizens’ perceptions 
and evaluations of police-citizen interactions in videos they were shown, in which the police 
exercise varying degrees of authority over the person they stopped, including verbal commands 
and physical force.180 After watching the videos, respondents were asked to evaluate the 
fairness of the police-citizen encounter, answering questions such as “Did the police act 
neutrally?” and “Were the police respectful?”181 Controlling for race, age, and gender, the 
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authors found that the perceived legitimacy of policing is based how people see officers 
exercising their authority and how professional they appear.182 “Where officers listen to people, 
explain the basis of their actions, treat them respectfully, and acknowledge people’s concerns 
in the situation, they are trusted and viewed as acting professionally,” the authors found.183  
 The empirical studies reported here confirm the commonsense notion that regular 
conflicts with community views in the allocation of criminal liability and punishment will reduce 
the criminal law’s moral credibility. (And regular conflicts with community notions of fairness 
and professionalism in adjudication and policing will reduce the system’s legitimacy.) 
 
B. A Response to Critics 
 
 Most critics have not explicitly disputed the claim that regular conflicts with 
community’s justice judgments undermine the system’s moral credibility.184 Some expressly 
concede it,185 but some critics have argued that ordinary people look to a host of social and 
cultural factors other than desert in judging appropriate criminal liability and punishment. Thus, 
conflicts with community justice judgments would not necessarily be disillusioning. Indeed, the 
failure to deviate from community justice judgments could itself be disillusioning in those cases 
where the community is relying upon non-desert factors in judging appropriate criminal liability 
and punishment.186 But this criticism simply ignores the empirical evidence that ordinary people 
focus on desert in assessing proper criminal liability and punishment, at the exclusion of other 
criteria that might conflict with desert, as the studies described in the previous section show.187  
Even if one found that citizens, fearing for their own personal safety, for example, were 
willing to compromise their commitment to desert by taking into account some non-desert  
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to prevention factors independently of desert factors...All of this could be beside the point if divergence from the 
modal punishment assigned by lay people has little or no effect on the moral credibility of the law, or if any such 
effect it does have does not lead to serious real-world impacts in terms of compliance, cooperation, and related 
desideratum”).  
187 Slobogin relies upon his own study as showing that people do not necessarily think and punishment in terms of 
just deserts. See Slobogin supra note 2 at 386-387 (“Desert certainly plays a role in lay persons’ decisions about 
punishment (a conclusion that a number of our studies support), but not the sole consideration”).  However, as 
Robinson and co-authors have shown in their response to Slobogin's article, a close examination of Slobogin's 
methodology and results suggest that they in fact support Robinson's claim rather than undermining it. Paul 
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criteria, it hardly follows that this deviation from desert would boost the criminal justice 
system’s moral credibility. On the contrary, the citizens themselves might well see the deviation 
as an unfortunate practical compromise for their safety, hardly something that they are proud 
of, and hardly something that improves the system’s moral credibility with them. (Rather than 
doing justice, the empirical studies suggest that people might prefer, for example, to use of a 
civil commitment system to protect them from dangerous, blameless persons, and to preserve 
the criminal justice system’s focus strictly on desert.) 
 One critic argues that there are a number of factors, beyond unjust results, that can 
affect the criminal justice system’s overall reputation.188 We completely agree. As we noted in 
Part II, for example, a criminal justice system’s reputation for fair adjudication and professional 
policing will affect its reputation. One can call it the system’s “legitimacy” as Tom Tyler does or 
can include it in the system’s “moral credibility” as this critic seems to. But there is nothing in 
this that takes away from the value of generally tracking community justice judgments to 
maximize the system’s moral credibility within the community. Deference, compliance, and 
internalization can be increased by improving the system’s reputation in both respects. The fact 
that procedural fairness and police professionalism can help does nothing to take away from 
the fact that doing justice and avoiding injustice in allocating liability and punishment can also 
help.189 Indeed, as noted above, the empirical evidence suggests that these two forces tend to 
reinforce one another.190 
 Another critic argues that: “There is no good reason why empirical desert should induce 
compliance among laypeople if they are true retributivists.”191 In other words, it’s not empirical 
data about the community’s views that matters to people, but rather their own views about 
what is just. But we have never argued that the ordinary person is a good consequentialist who 
will want to support empirical desert because of its crime-control benefits. On the contrary, the 
ordinary person will be more inclined to comply because they see a criminal law that, by their 
own personal view of just deserts, is in fact doing justice and avoiding injustice. Our calculations 
may be based on a data-driven empirical desert, but people will experience results is what they 
see as true deontological desert. 
 This critic wants to claim that this is a form of “exploitation” of ordinary people,192 
because one is pretending that the system is retributivist (based on deontological desert) when 
in fact it is consequentialist (based upon empirical desert). But while this philosopher may well 
get worked up about whether the creation of liability rules are properly motivated – by the 
reasoning of deontological desert rather than the consequentialism of empirical desert – are we 
to assume that ordinary people care, or even understand, the difference? To them, either the 
 
Robinson et al., Empirical Desert, Individual Prevention, and Limiting Retributivism 17 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 312, 340 
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188 See Rappaport supra note 2 at 807 (“There is an additional concern with the moral credibility argument: existing 
research does not distinguish between the credibility of outcomes in individual cases and that of the system as a 
whole. In other words, the data do not show whether people regard a system as morally credible when outcomes 
in individual cases are perceived as just but the systemic effects are not. After all, sentences are not the only 
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189 See Tyler (2006) supra note at 56 (reporting the relative weight of the factors shaping compliance with the law 
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results are just or they are not. The theoretical motivations in the head of the lawmaker back 
when the rule was created have no practical relevance for ordinary people. 
 
IV. Constructing a Distributive Principle that Promotes Moral Credibility by Minimizing 
Conflicts with Community Views 
 
 One might conclude that there is indeed crime-control value in trying to maximize the 
criminal law’s moral credibility with the community by generally tracking empirical desert, but 
nonetheless conclude that such a practice is not possible, or at least not practical. How could 
such a maximize-moral-credibility distributive principle be constructed? 
 
A. Tracking Empirical Desert 
 
 One can imagine any number of potential obstacles to constructing such a distributive 
principle. Perhaps justice such a complex judgment that everybody simply has their own 
personal view about everything? Perhaps people's justice judgments are just general vague 
notions, nothing that could be used to produce the specific rules required by a criminal code or 
sentencing guidelines? Perhaps the proposed distributive principle can’t realistically be 
operationalized because people’s justice judgments are constantly changing, and this makes it 
impractical or at least expensive to maintain such a distributive principle? 
 Is justice such a complex judgment that everybody simply has their own personal view 
about everything? The empirical evidence suggests otherwise.193 On some issues, there is in 
fact a high degree of agreement across demographics. Many of these areas of high agreement 
might be called the “core of wrongdoing” because they concern such fundamental offenses as 
physical injury to others, taking property without consent, and deceit in exchanges. Consider 
one study that had subjects rank order 24 scenarios according to overall blameworthiness, 
deserved punishment. The kinds of offenses in the scenarios represent 94.9% of the offenses 
committed in the United States. The results show a Kendall’s W of 0.95 for in-person subjects 
and 0.88 for Internet subjects — an astounding result. One can’t normally get this level of 
agreement except in observational studies, as with asking subjects to judge the relative 
brightness of dot clusters. Where subjects are asked for something beyond the purely 
observational, to have this high level of agreement the analytic task requested must be almost 
intuitional.  
 Are people's justice judgments just general vague notions, nothing that could be used to 
produce the specific rules required by a criminal code or sentencing guidelines? The empirical 
studies suggest that even uneducated people have very sophisticated and nuanced judgments 
about justice. Small changes in facts produce predictable changes in blameworthiness 
judgments.194 People’s judgments don’t tie a particular level of blameworthiness to a particular 
punishment level, but because ordinary people can distinguish so many cases along the 
blameworthiness continuum, and because the punishment continuum contains a finite number 
of points (meaningful differences require larger units as the length of imprisonment gets 
longer), people’s judgments about the relative blameworthiness of a case against all other 
cases end up putting the case at a particular point on the punishment continuum. This is not 
because there is some magical connection between that amount of blameworthiness and that 
 
193 Robinson (2013) supra note 1 at 18–34. 
194 See id., Part III for a wide range of such studies. 
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amount of punishment, but rather because it is that single point on the punishment continuum 
that puts the case in its proper ordinal rank in relation to all other cases. If the endpoint of the 
punishment continuum changes, so too will the punishment location of each case on the 
continuum. 
 The endpoint of the punishment continuum is not something on which people’s 
judgments are fixed. We see significant endpoint differences among different societies, which 
confirms how malleable the endpoint judgment is. Judgments of relative blameworthiness, in 
contrast, especially concerning the core of wrongdoing, are not so malleable. This is confirmed 
by the fact that we find the same rank ordering of most crime scenarios across demographics 
and cultures.195 
 This high level of agreement on relative blameworthiness within the core of wrongdoing 
is not a surprise when one considers that people’s judgments of justice are in some significant 
part a feature of human evolutionary development.196 And this is consistent with evidence 
suggesting that many justice judgments are in large part intuitional, rather than the product of 
conscious reasoning.197  
 As one moves out from the core of wrongdoing, disagreements among people do 
appear. Downloading music from the Internet without a license can be seen as analogous to 
traditional theft but is not itself a physical taking without consent. Thus, while there may be 
strong agreement on issues relating to the core of physical taking, there will be disagreement 
on the downloading issue depending upon the extent to which a person has accepted the 
analogy between unlicensed downloading and physical taking.  
 Given that there is disagreement on some issues, doesn’t that mean that it is simply 
impossible to track community views? No. As the studies cited in Part II make clear, there is no 
magical trigger point of moral credibility below which a criminal justice system will collapse. 
Rather, the credibility-compliance relationship is a continuous one. Any loss of credibility – 
perhaps because the law has adopted a majority view and the minority is thereby incrementally 
disillusioned – will create some corresponding incremental loss in compliance with those 
people. But this incremental loss in this minority on this issue does not alter the value of trying 
to maximize moral credibility with as much of the community as possible. 
 The critical point here is to see that tracking empirical desert is not something to be 
done for its own sake but rather is generally the best approach to building moral credibility with 
the community. The real question for the criminal code or sentencing guideline drafters is: what 
position will cause the least alienation and disillusionment among the population generally? 
 In some cases, this may not be the strict majority view. One can imagine an issue upon 
which the majority holds one view but without much strength of feeling, while a significant 
minority holds a contrary view with very strong feelings. To them, a criminal law that conflicts 
with this view would necessarily suffer an enormous loss of moral credibility. Thus, under the 
right circumstances, the criminal code or sentencing guidelines drafters would best protect and 
promote the system’s moral credibility by adopting the minority view.  
 Perhaps the proposed distributive principle can’t realistically be operationalized because 
people’s justice judgments are constantly changing, and this makes it impractical or at least 
expensive to maintain such a distributive principle. However, the vast majority of issues that 
must be reflected in a criminal code or sentencing guidelines do not change – this is certainly 
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true of criminal laws core principles of wrongdoing and blameworthiness198 – and those issues 
that do change tend to shift only slowly. In the last decade or two we have seen a variety of 
developments resulting in criminal law changes, including, for example, the decriminalization of 
same-sex intercourse, the increased criminalization of unconsented to intercourse, and new 
offenses required by advances in technology. While this latest period has been a whirlwind of 
activity compared to previous eras, even these latest developments represent a new trivial 
portion of the issues that need to be decided by criminal code or sentencing guideline 
drafters.199 
 
B. A Response to Critics 
 
 We have already noted and responded to several sorts of criticisms about the feasibility 
of constructing a criminal code or sentencing guidelines based upon a distributive principle of 
maximizing moral credibility. First, the claim that such a project is not possible because there is 
no such thing as the community view200 – essentially the argument that everyone disagrees 
about everything – is simply not consistent with empirical evidence. The significant agreement 
across demographics on many core principles was hidden from us for some time because the 
agreement concerned the rank ordering of cases, while researchers were focused instead on 
levels of severity. That is, while different communities might disagree on how severely to 
punish murder, they generally agree that murder deserves more punishment than rape, which 
in turn deserves more punishment than theft, and so on.  
 Second, the claim that constructing a criminal liability and punishment system based 
upon community justice judgments is not possible because people’s judgments are only rough, 
general feelings,201 is simply inconsistent with the evidence. People’s blameworthiness 
judgments, even people with little or no education, are generally nuanced and sophisticated. 
Ordinary people may not be very good at articulating the blameworthiness principles that they 
use, but even small changes in the offense situation can produce significant and predictable 
changes in people’s justice assessment. 
 Third, some critics have argued that the existence of controversial issues creates 
intractable problems for the project.202 Other critics relatedly argue that the existence of issues 
 
198 Paul Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 CAMBRIDGE 
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199 See generally Paul Robinson & Ehson Kashfipour, Criminal Law’s Core Principles (forthcoming 2021) (explaining 
that people’s judgments on core principles such as “greater harm deserves greater punishment,” “harm to persons 
is more wrongful than harm to property,” “an actor who lacks the capacity to know his conduct is wrong or to 
avoid committing it is not blameworthy,” and more).   
200 See Slobogin supra note 2 at 392 (explaining that his study found that “disagreement...was remarkably high”). 
201 See Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice Just Us? Using Social Science to Inform Substantive Criminal Law 87 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315, 324 (1996) (noting that the community of individuals tested is “generally uninformed – both 
in the sense that it has not thought deeply about the relevant issues, and in the sense that it does not know the 
legal context in which a given legal provision operates”). 
202 See Ristroph (2010) supra note 2 at 1161 (“Much of Robinson’s work addresses the implications of moral 
intuitions for sentencing choices – how much to punish. Legal moralism, at least as represented in contemporary 
references to the Hart-Devlin debate, seems to be primarily an argument about criminalization – whether certain 
conduct, such as same sex intimacy between consenting adults, should be exempt from criminal regulation 
altogether. Robinson has written relatively little about controversial morals-based criminal prohibitions”).  
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upon which there are disagreements within the community means that by accommodating the 
views of one group one is necessarily alienating the other group.203 
 But these critics don’t see the bigger picture. It is easy for academics in particular to 
focus on the points of controversy – such as disagreements about the criminalization of same-
sex intercourse, or some other hot issue of the day – but the criminal code and sentencing 
guideline drafters have hundreds or thousands of issues to deal with, very few of which have 
such controversy. The primary work of a distributive principle is to give an answer to each of 
those thousands of diverse issues: criminalizing risk creation, the objective requirements of 
complicity, omission liability, desistance and renunciation in attempt, use of deadly force in 
self-defense, use of force in defense of property, citizens law enforcement authority, offense 
culpability requirements and mistake defenses, culpability requirements for complicity, 
voluntary intoxication, the individualization of the objective standard of negligence, 
formulations of the insanity defense, the immaturity defense, the involuntary intoxication 
defense, the duress defense, the entrapment defense, grading distinctions among sexual 
offenses, the felony murder rule, causation requirements, punishment of multiple offenses, and 
more. (Even in its present early stages of research, empirical studies on ordinary people’s 
justice judgments already exist for every issue on this list.204) In the real world, the work of the 
criminal justice system that forms ordinary people’s judgments about the justness of its results 
involves a lot more than the hot issue of the day.  
 It is true that a particularly controversial issue requires the special attention of code and 
sentencing guideline drafters. The greater the media attention to an issue, the greater the 
possibility for undermining the system’s moral credibility, at least with regard to that issue in 
the short term. It is the long-term reputation of the system, of course, that matters in people’s 
assessment of the system’s general reputation as a reliable moral authority, but its handling of 
the current hot issue of the day remains important.  
 Does the existence of such a controversial issue present an existential threat to 
maximizing moral credibility as a distributive principle? No. The analytic process for criminal 
code and sentencing guideline drafters would be the same as with any other of the thousands 
of issues on which they must take a position. What position will most effectively promote and 
protect the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community? As noted above, this may not 
be simply a matter of adopting the majority view. 
 
V. Philosophical, Political, and Ideological Objections 
 
 The previous sections have responded to critics’ attacks on the key elements supporting 
the proposed distributive principle: that reduced moral credibility incrementally reduces the 
criminal law’s crime-control effectiveness, that regular conflicts with community justice 
judgments reduce the criminal law’s moral credibility, and that it is feasible to use such a 
distributive principle to construct a criminal code, sentencing guidelines, and sentencing policy 
directives. But there remain a series of other criticisms that have been offered that go beyond 
these points, criticisms based primarily upon the philosophical, political, or ideological 
preferences of the critics. 
 
 
203 See Slobogin supra note 2 at 378 (“Changing the official stance on controversial issues to appease one group is 
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A. The Proposed Distributive Principle Would Necessarily Produce Draconian Sentences 
 
 A common complaint is that relying upon community views would necessarily produce a 
draconian system of punishment, and one need only look at the current state of criminal law 
liability and punishment doctrines to confirm this. Today’s punishment system is quite harsh. As 
one critic noted, “A majority of the country continues to support the death penalty and still 
believes that courts are too lenient. Well under 20 percent of Americans think that prison 
conditions are too harsh.”205 In light of people’s apparently harsh and draconian beliefs about 
punishment, “populism makes criminal justice more, not less, severe,” this critic argues.206 “The 
movements to rein in [indeterminate sentencing as a mechanism of mercy] were fueled by the 
same distrust of experts and elites that the democratizers espouse today, boosted by harsh 
popular views.”207 
 But these criticisms confuse “populism” generally with the proposal here that criminal 
liability and punishment rules be constructed to avoid conflicts with community justice 
judgments. The empirical evidence shows that ordinary people, as opposed to politicians and 
political advocates, do not in fact have the draconian sensibilities that the critics assume. 
 Consider, for example, a study that tested ordinary people’s views on a wide variety of 
current crime-control doctrines, including felony murder, the three-strikes rule, the 
criminalization of regulatory violations, the narrowing of the insanity defense, high penalties for 
drug offenses, adult prosecution of juveniles, and the use of strict liability. Subjects were given 
scenarios describing twelve real-world cases that illustrate the operation of one of these, crime-
control doctrines. The research reveals that such doctrines clearly do not reflect community 
views. Just the opposite; they dramatically conflict with them.208 They may well be consistent 
with the coercive crime-control strategies of general deterrence or incapacitation of the 
dangerous, but they have the effect of disconnecting criminal punishment from community 
notions of justice. 
 In the study, subjects were asked to rank order the twelve modern crime-control cases 
and twelve “milestone” cases – cases that previous research has shown provide milestones 
along the full length of the punishment continuum with a high degree of agreement across 
demographics. When the 24 cases are rank ordered, one can see just how serious the 
respondents thought the crime-control cases were in relation to each one of the milestone 
cases. The crime-control cases, which have draconian penalties in law, were in fact perceived by 
the subjects as being dramatically less serious and blameworthy than the law treats them. For 
example, in one case where the three-strikes doctrine was applied to a minor fraud, ultimately 
resulting in a life sentence for the offender, the subjects viewed the overall deserved 
punishment as somewhat more serious than stealing a microwave from a house and somewhat 
less serious than a minor assault at a record store. The subjects gave a sentence of 2.3 years 
and 3.9 years respectively, for these offenses – significantly less than the life sentence that air 
conditioning fraudster received.  
The size of the disconnect between laypeople’s intuitions and the actual results 
delivered by the criminal justice system is telling not only as a predictor of public 
disillusionment, but also as an indicator that legislative aims are out of touch with public needs. 
Note, for example, that the coercive crime-control cases here are not cases in which some 
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renegade prosecutor or rogue judge tricked the system but rather are cases where the crime-
control doctrine is being lawfully applied as designed. The air conditioning fraud case discussed 
above went to the U.S. Supreme Court where the conviction and life sentence were affirmed. 
 The figure below visually displays the dramatic nature of the law-community conflict 
revealed by the study. Note Case F, the air conditioning fraud case, on the right-hand margin. 
The solid line to the center indicates where on the punishment continuum the subjects placed 
this case, close to the three-year mark. The dashed sloping line indicates the punishment that 
was actually imposed, life imprisonment. 
 The important point here is to see on the right-hand side the dramatic difference 
between the solid lines and the corresponding dashed lines for each case. The enormity of the 
law-community conflict is emphasized by the fact that the punishment scale in this graphic is 
exponential, not linear. Each of the large dots, 1 through 8, represents typically a doubling of 
punishment – the standard structure of criminal code offense grade categories in the United 
States. Thus, if the difference between the solid line and the dashed line for any case were only 
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the difference between 4 and 5 on the punishment scale, that small difference on the scale 
means that the offender got twice the punishment that the subjects thought was deserved. In 
fact, the community-law differences are all dramatically more than that. 
 How could such a conflict occur in a democracy? It is not the draconian justice 
judgments of ordinary people that are producing these modern crime-control doctrines but 
rather politicians’ reliance on coercive crime-control theories like general deterrence and 
incapacitation of the dangerous – crime-control theories developed and pressed in the past 
largely by academics.209 Having criminal liability and punishment rules track community views 
could be an effective way of short-circuiting these injustice-producing doctrines. 
 Still, some critics say that even the sentences imposed by the subjects in the study 
described above are too high. As one critic noted, “Although the sentences they chose were, on 
average, much more lenient than those imposed in the actual cases on which they were based, 
they were still quite substantial . . . . My own sense is that most of these sentences are 
‘harsh’.”210 We may well agree with this critic’s personal sensibilities, but that still does not 
provide the basis for a conclusion that the proposed distributive principle would necessarily 
condemn us to harsh penalties. While the principle of blameworthiness proportionality may be 
permanently fixed in ordinary people’s minds, we know from existing evidence that the general 
severity level of the punishment continuum is not. Different societies have significantly 
different endpoints on their punishment continuums, indicating different accepted levels of 
harshness.211 And nothing in the proposed distributive principle calls for higher rather than 
lower severity. 
 To maintain moral credibility, the criminal justice system cannot at any given time fall 
too far below the general severity level that exists in the community’s mind at that moment. 
However, one could nudge the endpoint of the punishment continuum incrementally lower on 
a regular basis. Reducing it five percent every year or two, for example, is not likely to be 
enough to undermine the system’s moral credibility, and people will simply adjust their 
expectations accordingly.212 Indeed, we have seen just such a dynamic after the enactment of 
the federal truth-in-sentencing legislation that did away with early release on parole. Sentences 
imposed in court dropped dramatically because they were now real sentences, not sentences 
subject to parole commission release before one-third of the sentence was served. While there 
was some initial upset, it soon passed, and people simply adopted the new sentences as 
establishing the new severity norm.213 
 Of course, we may all have our own personal preferences about how severe punishment 
should be, but that does not make them the truth of the proper severity level. Ultimately, the 
proper endpoint of the punishment continuum is a political question for which any liberal 
democracy ought to take into account community preferences. But the point is that those 
preferences are malleable and to the extent that one has persuasive arguments for reducing 
the punishment continuum endpoint, as community views shift toward lower severity the 
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proposed distributive principle would demand that the criminal law rules and policies shift as 
well. 
 Further, there is good reason to think that the adoption of maximizing moral credibility 
through empirical desert as a distributive principle would immediately require a reduction in 
the sentences imposed for most serious offenses. At the moment, most serious offenses are 
given the same punishment at the high-end point of the punishment continuum – death, life, 
30 years, or whatever the maximum might be. As we have shown, however, people prefer strict 
blameworthiness proportionately, and thus the lay intuitions captured by empirical desert 
would likely encompass such a demand. Under a moral credibility distributive principle that 
required strict blameworthiness proportionality, the serious blameworthiness differences 
present in the most serious cases must be given voice. In other words, most of the sentences 
for serious offenses must be forced down from the punishment continuum endpoint in order to 
distinguish the more egregious cases from the less egregious cases. And, indeed, the 
punishment continuum endpoint must be reserved for the most egregious case that could 
come along, as some proposed and enacted criminal codes adopting this principle note.214 (One 
implication of this might be that, while the death penalty might remain on the books, it might 
never be used because it would be inappropriate if one could imagine a more egregious case 
than the case at hand, which one probably always can imagine.215) Ultimately, a punishment 
system based on the distributive principle of maximizing moral credibility, generally by tracking 
empirical desert, is likely to be less punitive than its coercive crime-control rivals of general 
deterrence or incapacitation of the dangerous.  
 
B. The Proposed Distributive Principle Is Unprincipled and Meaningless  
 
 In addition to their concerns about empirical desert’s propensity for harsh punishment, 
a number of critics dismiss the proposed distributive people as unprincipled and meaningless. 
“One aspect of this claim is particularly worrisome, and that is the implicit rejection of principle 
per se. Populist sentencing, rebranded as ‘normative crime control’ is proposed as the guiding 
factor at the expense of principled sentencing,” one critic has written.216 Another has 
commented: “Once desert is untethered from the retributive principle of an eye for an eye, 
what does it mean to say that someone deserves a particular punishment? Not much – or 
rather, almost anything you like.”217 
 These criticisms seem to assume that we offer empirical desert as a substitute for more 
philosophers’ deontological desert, and that it fails in that role. But we have never made such a 
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claim. Maximizing moral credibility by tracking empirical desert as determined by social 
psychologists is offered for its consequentialist crime-control benefits. Deontological desert, as 
espoused by moral philosophers, seeks to develop the truth of justice through the reasoning of 
argument and analysis. We have always been careful and explicit in distinguishing the two.218 
 Perhaps some of these critics know that we have been careful to distinguish 
deontological and empirical desert. Their real objection is just that: that empirical desert is not 
deontological desert. That is, perhaps they see value only in the principled, reasoned 
assessment of desert from moral philosophers, which empirical desert is not. We would agree 
that there is value in such philosophical work. It can provide a useful basis for contributing to 
the public conversation that can help shape community justice judgments. But as Part VI.C. 
below demonstrates, deontological desert, by its own terms, simply cannot produce a criminal 
code or sentencing guidelines. 
 The distributive principle proposed here is indeed “principled;” it simply has a 
consequentialist principle – the system’s increased moral credibility reduces crime – rather 
than a deontological one. And it is not meaningless; it simply has a meaning other than 
deontological desert. 
 
C. “Community Sentencing,” “Cherry Picking,” and the Public as Bad Policy Makers   
 
 A number of criticisms have been offered that more than anything suggest a 
misunderstanding of what is being proposed. These criticisms, which encompass a wide 
assortment of flawed interpretations of empirical desert, are addressed below. 
 Some critics complain that the proposed distributive principle is one that involves 
“community sentencing” and such would be dangerous and unwise.219 We agree that 
community sentencing would be dangerous and unwise. Community sentencing of individual 
cases would be seriously unwise because community views about a specific case could well be 
distorted by media misstatements of the facts, or subconscious or conscious biases arising from 
the particular offender or offense situation.220 
 It’s hard to know why these critics would think we would propose such a thing.  It has 
been made explicit from the start of this work sometime ago that the proposal is for a 
distributive principle of criminal liability and punishment that sets rules and policies; it does not 
adjudicate individual cases. As one of us wrote more than a dozen years ago, for example, the 
proposal “envisions a set of liability and punishment rules to be applied identically to all 
defendants; it is not the community’s view of deserved punishment in a particular case that is 
relevant here. Further, in collecting data to construct the rules, real cases, especially publicly 
known cases, typically are not a useful source. People’s views on such cases are commonly 
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underlying theories that drive the two conceptions of desert and that thereby shape their application. In its most 
fundamental form, the difference is this: The special value of the empirical conception of desert is its utilitarian 
effectiveness in crime-control; the special value of the deontological conception of desert is its ability to produce 
true principles of justice independent of personal or community opinion”).  
219 See Robinson (2007) supra note 1 at 43 (Explaining that one of the criticisms of empirical desert is that “While a 
community may share a view that certain conduct is immoral or certain punishment is just, such views do not 
make it so. Witness the cases of slave holders in the pre-Civil War south”). 
220 See Denno supra note 2 at 752-758. 
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biased by political or social context or by other factors, such as race, that all would agree have 
no proper role in setting principles of justice.”221  
 One of the strengths of empirical desert’s social scientific methods of testing lay 
intuitions is that they can give a true sense of community justice judgments free of these 
distortion effects. The scenarios used to test subjects do not include factors that the 
community generally agrees would be inappropriate to affect the liability and punishment 
decision, such as the race of the offender. On the whole, people seem likely to see greater 
moral credibility in a criminal law that screened out these undesirable distortions. 
 But at least one critic apparently sees this aspect of empirical desert as a weakness 
rather than a strength. In what is referred to as the “cherry-picking challenge,” the critic argues 
that empirical desert theorists seek to capture only particular aspects of punishment intuitions 
that best align with their goals. “Empirical desert advocates have yet to show why the particular 
intuitions they examine are the ones most likely to help us improve compliance. Rather, they 
often screen out certain intuitions in ways that seem designed to promote more 
deontologically-justified policies. In so doing, they seem to shift into a justificatory mode that 
imports non-consequentialist values and undermines empirical desert’s consequentialist 
foundations,” this critic explains.222 “To be clear, I am not arguing that empirical desert 
advocates should query angry, biased, or drug addicted subjects. Rather, I claim that advocates 
must defend their choices.”223 
 The defense is not difficult to provide: from their own life experience, ordinary people 
know the difference between an angry reaction and a thoughtful response that attempts to be 
fair-handed and unbiased. While they themselves might even be regularly guilty of the former, 
they will respect and give deference to a criminal justice system that tries to do the latter. 
Adopting this approach does not require the empirical desert advocate to become a 
retributivist, as is suggested. It simply requires asking what characteristics the general 
community would find to be admirable and what characteristics it would find to be 
inappropriate in judging criminal liability and punishment.224 
 Finally, some critics complain that ordinary people are simply too uninformed about 
matters important to criminal justice policy to be consulted in designing the system.225 A more 
specific challenge of the same sort asks whether the public wants a distributive principle based 
 
221 Robinson supra note 178 at 149. 
222 Kolber supra note 2 at 441. 
223 Id. at  448 
224 As Robinson has argued elsewhere, in designing their experiments, empirical desert researchers would do well 
to consult the moral philosophy literature early in the design process, for there is no other literature that has more 
carefully explored what the issues and alternatives might be. See Paul Robinson, The Role of Moral Philosophers in 
the Competition Between Deontogical and Empirical Desert 48 W.M. L. REV. 1831, 1839 (2007) (“The moral 
philosophy literature is the richest and most sophisticated source about lay intuitions of justice that exists today, 
and it is the starting point that I recommend to any social psychologist doing research in the area”). 
225 Denno supra note 2 at 754 (“Opinion polls in the United States and other countries show that the public has 
little knowledge of the nature and extent of crime. Moreover, what little knowledge the public has is substantially 
distorted...Opinion polls also show that people have limited or poor knowledge of their basic legal rights, or of 
particular pieces of legislation, even highly publicized legal reforms. The general public evidences very little 
knowledge of sentencing structure or of the severity of punishments that the legal system actually imposes...If the 
Justice respondents’ views are consistent with the public’s, their overestimate of crime rates and reoffending, as 
well as their underestimate of the criminal justice system’s sentencing severity, could influence their perceptions 
of certain legal doctrines”).   
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upon empirical desert.226 This sort of criticism asks whether people wouldn’t prefer a 
distributive principle designed by experts rather than by their peers.  
 Once again, though, this criticism misunderstands empirical desert’s function. As we 
have said earlier, we do not propose relying upon community views about criminal justice 
policy approaches such as what distributive principle to use. Rather, we recommend consulting 
community justice judgments to understand what will make the criminal justice system be seen 
as more morally credible to the community. Thus, even though we can actually discern what 
distributive principle the community would want – one based upon their conception of desert, 
as the empirical studies have made clear227 – we are not following the community’s view here 
because we think they are the best policymakers but rather because their views on this point 
tell us how best to enhance the system’s reputation with them. 
   
VI. Is There a Better Distributive Principle Than Maximizing Moral Credibility through 
Empirical Desert? 
 
 Whatever one may conclude about the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed 
distributive principle – maximizing moral credibility through empirical desert – the ultimate 
question in shaping criminal law and sentencing rules is whether maximizing moral credibility is 
the best distributive principle or whether, all things considered, there is a better one, perhaps 
general deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous, or deontological desert. We will explain in 
Part VII that a moral credibility-based distributive principle does have some weaknesses, 
although not those claimed by its critics, but all alternative distributive principles have much 
greater weaknesses, some of which may be altogether disqualifying. Thus, this Part examines 
these competing distributive principles and demonstrates the seriousness of their problems. 
We conclude that the greatest strength of maximizing moral credibility as a distributive 
principle may be the weaknesses inherent in all alternatives. Robinson has written a good deal 
on the subject,228 but let us quickly sketch the nature of our criticisms against the various 
distributive principles with whom moral credibility is said to compete. 
 
A. General Deterrence 
 
 General deterrence can be an effective crime-control mechanism in principle, but rarely 
in practice.229 Having a criminal justice system that imposes punishment on wrongdoers 
certainly has a general deterrent effect. Less clear, however, is the effectiveness of general 
deterrence as the distributive principle for criminal liability and punishment – that is, setting 
liability and punishment rules so as to maximize their efficient general deterrent effect. 
 For a rule formulation to enhance general deterrence, it must meet at least three 
prerequisites. First, the intended audience must know of the rule. Second, the intended 
audience must be rational calculators who can and will behave in a way that promotes their 
self-interest in light of the rule. And third, their cost-benefit analysis under the rule must 
suggest that the cost of the contemplated violation outweigh its benefit.  
 
226 Ristroph (2010) supra note 2 at 1168 (“If, as Robinson suggests, some democratically enacted laws such as 
California’s three strikes law are inconsistent with empirical desert, one might ask whether there is a majoritarian 
preference for laws aligned with moral intuitions”).  
227 See supra Part II(A)(5). 
228 Robinson supra note 189 at 21–98, 141–207. 
229 Id. at 21-95.  
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 Unfortunately, rarely do these prerequisites exist in the real world. First, the empirical 
research suggests that the target audience rarely knows the law. Even when they think they 
know, they commonly have it wrong.230 Academics and politicians spend a good deal of time 
agonizing over the formulation and adoption of coercive crime-control doctrines, such as a 
felony-murder rule, the three-strikes rule, the use of strict liability, and other crime-control 
doctrines. But when the drug addict is standing outside the convenience store deciding whether 
to go in and rob it, what are the chances that he will know whether his jurisdiction has a felony-
murder rule and, if so, what variation it has. No doubt the jurisdiction spent enormous energy 
debating just these issues, but it is more than likely that those debates are all wasted on the 
would-be robber.  
 Second, even if people did know the legal rules, available research suggests that the 
target audience is more often than not anything but rational calculators. Instead, their decisions 
are heavily influenced by mental or emotional disturbance; drug use or addiction; group 
influence, especially by gangs; impulsiveness; and an indifference or inattentiveness to 
consequences. 
 Finally, even if the target audience did know the legal rules and were rational 
calculators, a general deterrent effect is possible only if the rational calculations suggest that 
the costs of the wrongdoing outweigh the benefits. Yet, the capture and punishment rate for 
most offenses are so low – commonly less than 100 to 1 for offenses other than homicide – that 
the target audience commonly sees the benefits as outweighing the costs. More importantly, 
the result of the calculation depends not on the reality of the situation but rather on the 
potential offender’s perception of it. Thus, when the empirical evidence suggests that many if 
not most potential offenders generally overestimate their ability to avoid detection and 
punishment, the general deterrence project can have limited effect even if punishment rates 
were in fact higher than people understand. 
 General deterrence’s problems only grow worse when it is compared to empirical 
desert. The liability and punishment imposed under empirical desert already carries some 
inherent general deterrent effect. The only way in which a general deterrence distributive 
principle can provide more deterrent effect is by deviating from desert, yet, when it deviates 
from desert it is operating at its worst. 
 First, if general deterrence as a distributive principle can have a greater deterrent effect 
than that already inherent in empirical desert distribution only by deviating from desert, then in 
every instance it will trigger the crime-control costs that arise from its conflict with community 
views. That is, the deviation from desert that gives it a deterrent edge also has the crime-
control cost that follows from reduced moral credibility. 
 Second, it has an enormous educational challenge if it is to have any effect. To have an 
effect, people must know the deterrence-based rule. But the empirical studies make clear that 
ordinary people assume the criminal law rule is as they think it should be: formulated to give 
deserved punishment based upon an offender’s overall blameworthiness, as discussed 
previously.231 Thus, whenever general deterrence deviates from empirical desert, it must 
overcome this desert-rule assumption and must make clear that the rule is different than 
people would otherwise expect. This can be difficult and often impractical.  
 
230 This is a particular problem in the United States where there are 51 American criminal codes. 
231 See supra Part II(A)(3), Part II(A)(5); Paul Robinson & John Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal 
Law and Justice 81 SOUTH. CAL. L. REV. 1, 39 (2007) (explaining that several studies have “examined the issue of what 
criteria people rely on when they make intuitive judgments of justice and found that it is desert, not deterrence or 
incapacitation, that drive people’s intuitive assignments of punishment”). 
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 One might argue that it is unfair for us to offer this criticism because empirical desert 
has a similar education challenge. Its compliance mechanism depends upon the community 
having an opinion about the system’s justness. One critic, for example, explains, “A wide range 
of survey research indicates that the public lacks knowledge about crime, crime rates, offender 
characteristics, and legal reforms. In turn, these misconceptions could influence the ‘ordinary’ 
person’s perceptions of certain legal doctrines.”232  
 But we think the effective communication hurdle that is so problematic for general 
deterrence does not apply to empirical desert. The message that general deterrence must send 
is one that identifies a particular kind of situation as one in which there is some exaggerated 
criminal liability and punishment threatened, more than that which the ordinary person would 
think was deserved. That is a specific nonintuitive fact which the general deterrence system 
must get into the minds of its target audience and to get them to use in evaluating the cost-
benefit analysis when they make their conduct decision. In the case of empirical desert, in 
contrast, all that is required is for the person to have some general opinion about the moral 
credibility of the criminal justice system, an opinion that every ordinary person will necessarily 
have simply by being exposed to the endless stream of information that they take in from news 
media, governmental statements, friends, acquaintances, and others. Their having an opinion 
on the criminal laws general justness does not require that they have a particular fact, as 
general deterrence’s educational challenge requires. 
 It is certainly true that the criminal justice system ought to make an effort to improve its 
reputation because that improvement can bring greater compliance, but even if the system has 
no public relations campaign to improve its image, the moral credibility-compliance dynamic 
will be at work. It will still be the case that regular conflicts with community views will reduce 
its credibility and reduction in conflicts will increase it. 
 
B. Incapacitation of the Dangerous 
 
 Incapacitation of the dangerous is as problematic a distributive principle as is general 
deterrence, but for different reasons.233 Unlike general deterrence, which has real difficulty 
producing a greater deterrent effect than that already inherent in a system designed to 
maximize moral credibility, incapacitation does in fact work. Putting people in prison does 
prevent further victimization, at least of the community. The problem with an incapacitation 
distributive principle is that behavioral scientists are at present relatively poor in reliably 
predicting future criminality in a specific individual. False positive rates are high, which creates 
enormous costs and intrusions on personal liberty with no crime-control benefit. The 
incapacitation distributive principle is particularly disadvantaged in the United States, where 
constitutional limitations imposed by courts limit the open use of such preventive detention 
and require instead that it be cloaked in criminal justice terms. Further, there is enormous 
political, and sometimes legal, resistance to preventive detention, so instead of being able to 
openly evaluate an offender’s predicted future dangerousness in setting a criminal sentence, 
liability and sentencing rules commonly use substitutes like prior criminal record, which have 
turned out to be even worse approximations of future dangerousness. 
 Finally, as with general deterrence, even if there were a situation where such preventive 
detention could provide a crime-control benefit by deviating from desert, any such advantage 
 
232 Denno supra note 2 at 765. 
233 Robinson supra note 188 at 99-107 (examining rehabilitation as a distributive principle). 
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could be wiped out by the loss of crime-control effectiveness that comes when such 
interventions deviate from desert. Incapacitation as a distributive principle can provide more 
prevention than that already inherent in a distributive principle of maximizing moral credibility 
only by deviating from empirical desert. But preventive detention in this respect is in an even 
worse position than general deterrence. At least general deterrence follows a proportionality 
principle of sorts that is consistent with empirical desert: the greater the wrongdoing to be 
deterred, the more it is worth investing in a greater deterrent threat (proportionality to harm 
rather than proportionality to blameworthiness). But incapacitation has no such principle of  
punishment proportionality to the seriousness of the past wrongdoing: the duration of the 
detention is tied to the duration of the dangerousness rather than the seriousness of the 
offense. It is for this reason, under an incapacitation theory, that the Supreme Court has 
historically allowed three-strikes-means-life rules for even minor crimes, such as for the air-
conditioning fraud in the Rummel case discussed in Part V.A.234 
 Thus, punishment – the term fits awkwardly here because the detention has nothing to 
do with the past offense and everything to do with prediction of a future offense – unbound 
from any sense of proportionality to the wrongdoing, would likely to be seen as appallingly 
unjust by most citizens. Thus, it would be even more likely than general deterrence to destroy 
the “criminal justice” system’s reputation for being just and thereby undermine its social 
influence to gain compliance, deference, and internalization.  
 
C. Deontological Desert 
 
 We are sympathetic to those advocating deontological desert as the criminal justice 
system’s distributive principle. Unfortunately, we must all face the reality that it is simply 
impossible to operationalize such a principle. Moral philosophers disagree among themselves 
about most issues relevant to criminal liability and punishment. If one were to endorse 
deontological desert as one’s distributive principle, how would a criminal code or a sentencing 
guideline drafter know which philosopher or group of philosophers to follow on any given 
issue? And, having non-philosophers make such judgments about the relative credibility of one 
philosopher over another short-circuits the reasoned rationality that marks out deontological 
desert as particularly desirable.  
 If one were trying to create a distributive principle that had high moral credibility among 
moral philosophers, voting among them might make sense, but that would not be deontological 
desert as a distributive principle but rather some special philosophers’ variation on empirical 
desert, which, given that philosophers as a group are not commonly a major source of crime, 
would seem to lack any utilitarian crime-control justification.  
 Perhaps the larger point is that deontological desert’s attraction is that it represents the 
true transcendent truth about justice. When two moral philosophers disagree on an issue, we 
know that one of them, if not both, must be wrong. The only way we can keep the 
transcendent-truth advantage of deontological desert is to have some rational reasoned 
mechanism by which we can figure out which philosopher is right, and there is no way by which 
humans can do that. The bottom line is that deontological desert is a beautiful aspirational goal 
but as a practical matter simply cannot be operationalized. 
 In evaluating the feasibility of operationalizing deontological desert consider, for 
example, the issue of grading criminal attempts. Should an unsuccessful attempt be graded the 
 
234 See supra Part IIA(5). 
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same as the substantive offense or graded as less severe because the contemplated offense 
harm or evil did not come about? The empirical studies make clear that nearly all ordinary 
people would grade the completed offense as more serious than the failed attempt because 
the harm or evil of the offenses actually comes about and, in their minds, that increases the 
offender’s blameworthiness and deserved punishment.235 But the deontologists are very much 
split on the issue.236 Some agree with the community view but many disagree, correctly 
pointing out that the attempted assassin’s conduct and intention are exactly the same in the 
two cases, and it is only a matter of moral luck as to whether his victim is missed or killed. How 
is the criminal code or sentencing commission drafter to decide which of these conflicting 
camps to follow when they decide how to grade criminal attempts? What is the mechanism 
that they are to use in evaluating which of these camps is “correct”?  
 Even if one wanted to follow a distributive principle of deontological desert, any 
mechanism the drafters use for picking one philosophical camp over another would simply 
illustrate the impossibility of operationalizing such a principle. If they take a vote among the 
moral philosophers to see which position is the majority view or if they look to see which group 
is made up of scholars with better reputations within the moral philosophy community, they 
are no longer operating under the reasoned analysis that is the draw of deontological desert. If 
they instead simply look to their own personal judgments about which position best reflects 
just deserts, then again they are failing to abide by the reasoned analysis deontological desert 
requires. If they try to play the role of moral philosopher and review the arguments on both 
sides, and try to reason out for themselves which position is the correct position, then they 
might be able to claim that their method is reasoned analysis, but it would be hard to say that 
the stumblings of these amateur philosophers are what we can trust to produce the correct 
deontological desert answer. 
 The truth is that deontological desert simply cannot provide the “correct” deontological 
desert answer. It is not in fact an operationalizable distributive principle but rather an 
expression of the value of reasoned analysis and of thinking critically about criminal liability and 
punishment rules. But while academics may cherish reasoned debate, and can provide useful 
insights by doing so, that is something quite different from providing a distributive principle for 
criminal liability and punishment upon which the real world can draft a criminal code or 
sentencing guidelines and policy statements.237 
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236 Robinson supra note 200 at 152.  
237 Another way of expressing this same point is to explain that asking a decision-maker to use deontological desert 
as a distributive principle in fact gives one a distributive principle significantly different from true deontological 
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 It is also the case that deontological desert would not have the crime-control 
effectiveness that empirical desert does. Unless, by chance, deontological desert comes out to 
exactly match empirical desert in its distribution of criminal liability and punishment, it will in 
places conflict with community views and thereby undermine the criminal law’s moral 
credibility. 
 As a practical matter, empirical desert is probably the best practical approximation of 
deontological desert rules. In discussing the issue of grading attempt above we saw that the 
deontologists are split on the issue while ordinary people tend to agree that attempts should be 
punished less severely than the substantive offense. Attempt grading is a useful example to 
show that there really is a difference between deontological and empirical desert. However, it 
is also true that on most issues the majority of moral philosophers are likely to support the 
community’s empirical desert position. That should be no surprise, really, given that 
deontologists are human beings that probably share the community’s intuitions of justice, even 
if their reasoned theoretical work may in some instances lead them to different conclusions. 
In our experience, most moral philosophers reviewing the results of the empirical studies, on 





 To summarize, general deterrence as a distributive principle is fine in theory but 
ineffective in practice, especially because it can have a greater general deterrent effect than 
that already inherent in maximizing moral credibility by tracking empirical desert distribution 
only in those cases where it deviates from desert, which is when it is at its least effective.239 
Incapacitation of the dangerous as a distributive principle does work, in the sense that it can 
prevent crime by those detained, but it lacks the ability at our current clinical level to be able to 
reliably predict who will and will not be dangerous and, if implemented, would essentially 
destroy the criminal justice system’s reputation for being a reliable moral authority that does 
justice and avoids injustice.240 Deontological desert is highly attractive as a distributive 
principle, but by its own terms of relying strictly upon rational analysis, it cannot produce a 
working criminal code or sentencing guidelines because there is no means by which the 
inevitable disagreements can be resolved by more rational analysis. In order to come up with 
the single answer required by drafters for each of the hundreds or thousands of issues that 
must be resolved, drafters must resort to non-deontological analysis, such as voting to decide 
competing claims, which leaves the result as being something other than deontological 
desert.241 Support for this distributive principle should be seen more as a public acclaim for the 
value in rational discourse about the deeper meaning of justice, a project that we very much 
support, but not a project that qualifies as a distributive principle for criminal liability and 
punishment in drafting real-world rules. 
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 Among the critics, some seem to have never offered an alternative distributive 
principle,242 which may have made it more difficult for them to see the virtues of empirical 
desert. Several critics seem to enthusiastically support deontological desert as a distributive 
principle,243 and at least one has publicly supported dangerousness as a distributive principle,244 
but, as noted here, those principles simply do not provide realistic alternatives to maximizing 
moral credibility. 
 
VII. Potential Weaknesses of the Proposed Distributive Principle Not Raised by Critics 
 
 While the critics have raised quite a few issues, which we think we have answered, 
there do exist some potential weaknesses in the proposed distributive principle of maximizing 
the criminal law’s moral credibility with the community, usually by tracking empirical desert. 
Perhaps the critics would have eventually gotten around to offering these criticisms. Two issues 
are worth addressing: First, the proposed distributive principle puts limits on the extent to 
which criminal law can be used to change existing norms. Second, the proposed principle 
requires one to be ever-vigilant in testing existing norms for whether they might deserve 
special reform attention.  
 
A. Limiting the Use of Criminal Law as a Means of Changing Community Norms 
 
 One reason to worry about having criminal law generally rely upon community justice 
judgments is that such a system may tend to impede the use of criminal law to bring about 
social change. Relying upon community views presumably means relying upon people’s existing 
views. But we know from history that existing views are not always the best for society. 
Changing those views can sometimes bring a better world.  
 Does reliance upon a moral credibility distributive principle condemn society to live with 
existing views forever? No. As the criminal law improves its moral credibility with the 
community – as it “earns moral credibility chips” with the community – it can selectively 
“spend” those chips by having criminal law lead rather than follow on selected issues of special 
importance to social reformers. The greater the moral credibility of the criminal law, the 
greater is the criminal law’s power to help shift community views. In other words, a criminal 
law that has earned a reputation as a reliable moral authority can be a powerful influence in 
the hands of social reformers. Consider, for example, the recent decriminalization of same-sex 
intercourse and increased criminalization of domestic violence and date rape. These criminal 
law reforms no doubt helped solidify the ongoing shift in community views. 
 However, the problem is that if the criminal law gets too far out in front of community 
views, the disparity between the two can potentially undermine the law’s moral credibility. 
American Prohibition, discussed previously, proves the point. Where the law reform did not 
successfully change community views, it provided a constant source of conflict points that 
increasingly undermine the criminal law’s moral credibility. As noted previously,245 crime rates 
during Prohibition went up, and not just for alcohol-related offenses but rather for a wide range 
of offenses unrelated to alcohol. People became habituated to lawbreaking. Perhaps worse, 
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pushing too far ahead without successfully shifting views can undermine the law’s reputation in 
a way as to reduce law’s usefulness to social reformers in the future. 
 The lesson for social reformers here is simply to be careful in “spending the criminal 
law’s credibility chips.” Don’t use criminal law is a reform device until other societal institutions, 
political, social, religious, and other, have been used to gain community support. With that 
momentum, criminal law can make a real contribution. And, as community views continue to 
change, the damaging conflict points will increasingly diminish. 
 
B. The Need to Keep Testing Existing Norms Against Societal Aspirations 
 
 Because empirical desert is not deontological desert, any society must be vigilant about 
testing their existing norms against what that society will want them to be in the future. With 
20-20 hindsight, the Germans who voted for Adolf Hitler and the pre-Civil War Southerners who 
supported slavery might well have a very different opinion today. We have no magical way to 
see around history’s corner – nor do moral philosophers – but we can remain aware that some 
of our current norms will indeed be seen as inappropriate by future generations, and we should 
constantly critically assess our existing norms to see whether we think they ought to change.  
 Moral philosophers, and many social and political organizations and institutions, are 
available to help us in that constant testing. But they are not likely to have clear answers for us, 
for if the answer were clear it probably would have already altered or be in the process of 
altering existing norms. Nonetheless, these sources of critical debate can at least identify for us 
the possibilities. Will society come to accept the notion that sentient animals should have the 
same rights as humans? Will ordinary expectations of privacy dramatically expand? Will suicide 
be seen as a human right? It is impossible to tell at the moment what our future society will 
decide, but it is worth having someone asking the question. 
 This is not a problem unique to moral credibility as a distributive principle, of course. 
Any distributive principle, including deontological desert, will have the same problem. While no 
one has the ability to see around history’s corner, by openly acknowledging the problem we can 
advertise the importance of this societal questioning. There is nothing in the proposal that 
requires deontological desert supporters to get lobotomies, so there is no reason to think that 
they will cease to raise the challenges and questions that they have in the past, which are so 




 We have sought to show that the criminal justice system’s reputation with the 
community can have a significant effect on the extent to which people are willing to comply 
with its demands and internalize its norms. That reputation can be affected by a variety of 
things, including the fairness of the system’s adjudication procedures, the professionalism of its 
police, and the perceived legitimacy of the criminal justice authorities themselves. Our focus 
has been on the effect of the system’s long-term reputation for doing justice and avoiding 
injustice, its “moral credibility” with the community. Real-world natural experiments as well as 
controlled empirical studies, to say nothing of commonsense, support the notion that reduced 
moral credibility incrementally reduces compliance and the internalization of the law’s norms. 
The evidence also suggests that regular conflicts with community views undermine the law’s 
moral credibility. Thus, we propose that the distributive principle used to draft criminal codes, 
sentencing guidelines, and sentencing policy statements be to maximize the criminal law’s 
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moral credibility by adopting rules and policies that avoid such regular conflicts with community 
conceptions of justice. 
 We have presented and responded to a wide variety of objections from critics of this 
proposal. We show that those criticisms are commonly simply inconsistent with the available 
evidence, anecdotal and scientific, or reflect an inaccurate understanding of our proposal. On 
the other hand, we do suggest two sorts of complaints that one could make about our 
proposal, even though critics have not yet done so: the need for care in using criminal law to 
help change norms and the need to remain ever vigilant in testing the justness of current 
community views. 
 Perhaps most importantly, we have evaluated the alternative distributive principles and 
found that they have serious, often disqualifying, problems. We conclude that the greatest 
strength of maximizing moral credibility as a distributive principle may be the weakness of the 
alternatives. General deterrence works in principle, but because the prerequisites for its 
effective operation rarely exist in the real world, it is impractical as a distributive principle. 
Incapacitation of the dangerous does indeed work and does protect the community from 
dangerous offenders by incapacitating them, but because we lack the ability to predict future 
criminality with any significant degree of reliability, such a distributive principle would 
unjustifiably restrain non-dangerous offenders because of the high false positive rate and yet 
fail to identify some who are likely to be dangerous. Worse, because maximizing moral 
credibility carries with it an inherent general deterrent and incapacitation effect, these 
distributive principles can provide greater crime-control effectiveness only by deviating from 
empirical desert, thereby producing an endless stream of cases in which the community 
perceives a significant injustice or failure of justice, which then undermines the law’s moral 
credibility and its compliance and internalization power.. 
 Deontological desert is an attractive alternative, but we show that by its own terms it 
simply cannot be operationalized. Its search for the transcendent truth through rational 
analysis is an important and necessary activity, and one that we assume moral philosophers will 
continue to pursue even when maximizing moral credibility is the distributive principle. 
Deontologists can do much to encourage the constant testing of existing community views, 
which we encourage, and this constant questioning would hopefully lead to a public 
conversation by which community views over time change for the better. But the never-ending 
debate and analytic processes of deontological desert work well in the role of thoughtful gadfly 
but are simply unable to produce a codification of criminal law and sentencing guidelines and 
policies. Deontological desert supporters should take some comfort in the fact that an empirical 
desert distribution will produce results that most commonly match the majority views among 
deontologists. That is, while empirical desert is not deontological desert, it may be the best 
practical approximation of the most popular positions among deontologists. 
 Whether one believes that criminal law’s goal ought to be to minimize future crime or to 
do justice and avoid injustice, one ought to support a distributive principle for making criminal 
law rules and policies so as to maximize its moral credibility with the community. 
